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INTRODUCTION
More than eighteen months since the first approval of a COVID19 vaccine for use by the general public,1 vaccine manufacturing
remains concentrated in select countries, contributing to limited vaccine production and inequitable distribution globally. Inadequate
vaccination rates have cost lives, spurred virus variants, and imposed regressive economic hardship on populations.2 Redressing
this global imbalance, for both current and future health crises, requires accelerated technology transfer and wider distribution of production capacity, which means overcoming any intellectual property
(“IP”) obstacles that may exist in addition to various other logistical,
regulatory and supply-chain challenges to distribution.
1

UK Medicines Regulator Gives Approval for First UK COVID-19 Vaccine, GOV.UK
(Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-medicines-regulator-givesapproval-for-first-uk-covid-19-vaccine [https://perma.cc/BK8D-J9N9].
2
See generally, Mohammad N. Uddin & Monzurul A. Roni, Challenges of Storage and
Stability of mRNA-Based COVID-19 Vaccines, 9 VACCINES 1033 (2021).
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Two decades ago, World Trade Organization (“WTO”) Members responded to concerns about obstacles to access to medicines
posed by the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement” or “TRIPS”) by the
consensus adoption of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (“Doha Declaration” or “Declaration”).3
Among other things, the Declaration identified a number of policy
options, or “flexibilities,” open to WTO members to leverage access.4 While recognizing the right of WTO Members to use compulsory licenses and their freedom to determine the grounds for such
measures, the Declaration identified the difficulties associated with
using this mechanism by countries with no or limited pharmaceutical production capacity.5 A solution to these difficulties was provided initially by a waiver of Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement,
subsequently formalized as an amendment to the Agreement. The
solution took the form of a new kind of compulsory license, expressly tailored to the production of pharmaceuticals for export to
countries reliant on imports. This amendment, now in force for most
WTO Members, bypasses the restriction in Article 31(f) that normally limited production of medicines under compulsory licenses to
predominantly serve domestic markets.6
Alongside renewed calls for the more effective use, clarification
or reinforcement of existing ways to override IP exclusivity in the
public interest,7 the pandemic spurred a number of WTO Members

3

World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
4
The flexibilities explicitly identified in the Declaration are not exhaustive of the
potential policy options that Members can take while complying with TRIPS. See Andrew
Mitchell et al., Intellectual Property and Vaccine Manufacturing: Utilising Existing TRIPS
Agreement Flexibilities for COVID-19 and Other Public Health Crises, 25 TUL. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. (forthcoming).
5
Doha Declaration, supra note 3, ¶ 6.
6
See General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WTO Doc WT/L/540 (adopted Aug. 30, 2003).
7
See Communication from the European Union to the Council for TRIPS, European
Union – Draft General Council Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
in the Circumstances of a Pandemic, WTO Doc IP/C/W/681 (June 18, 2021) [hereinafter
Communication from the European Union].
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to pursue a new temporary waiver8 of certain obligations under
TRIPS in order to give governments a wider range of options to address the COVID-19 pandemic (“TRIPS waiver”).9 The initial proposal for a broad-scope TRIPS waiver was tabled10 at the WTO in
October 2020. Almost two years later, at the 12th Ministerial Conference in June 2022, a significantly different outcome emerged in
the form of a consensus Decision on the TRIPS Agreement.11 As
well as waiving obligations under Article 31(f), the Ministerial Decision implementing the waiver clarified existing options under the
TRIPS Agreement in the context of the pandemic response, in order
to facilitate and streamline measures enabling the diversification of
vaccine production without the consent of rights holders.
Up until the 12th Ministerial Conference, an extensive debate
between governments,12 and amongst analysts and scholars,13 on the
need for, and likely effectiveness of, a TRIPS waiver dominated discussion about IP rights in the pandemic context. By contrast,
8

See Communication from the African Group, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Egypt,
Eswatini, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Kenya, the LDC Group, Maldives, Mozambique,
Mongolia, Namibia, Pakistan, South Africa, Vanuatu, the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela and Zimbabwe, Waiver from Certain Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement for
the Prevention, Containment and Treatment of COVID-19, Revised Decision Text, WTO
Doc IP/C/W/669/Rev.1 (May 25, 2021) [hereinafter Revised Decision Text].
9
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15. 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15. 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3, Annex 1C (Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
10
See Communication from India and South Africa, Waiver from Certain Provisions of
the TRIPS Agreement for the Prevention, Containment and Treatment of COVID-19, WTO
Doc IP/C/W/669 (Oct. 2, 2020) [hereinafter Initial Waiver Text].
11
See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision on the TRIPS Agreement, WTO
Doc WT/MIN(22)/30 WT/L/1141 (June 22, 2022) [hereinafter Ministerial Decision].
12
See generally Council on Trade-Related Aspects for Intellectual Property Rights,
Minutes, WTO Docs IP/C/M/97.
13
This ongoing debate is robust. See, e.g., Academic Open Letter in Support of the
TRIPS Intellectual Property Waiver Proposal, LSE Policy Briefing Paper No. 46, (July 13,
2021); Siva Thambisetty et al., The TRIPS Intellectual Property Waiver Proposal:
Creating the Right Incentives in Patent Law and Politics to end the COVID-19 Pandemic
27 (LSE L. Soc’y, Econ. Working Papers No. 06/2021); James Bacchus, An Unnecessary
Proposal: A WTO Waiver of Intellectual Property Rights for COVID-19 Vaccines, 78 FREE
TRADE BULL. 1, 1 (2020); Bryan Mercurio, WTO Waiver from Intellectual Property
Protection for COVID-19 Vaccines and Treatments: A Critical Review 62 VA. J. OF INT’L
L. ONLINE 11 (2021); Bryan Mercurio, 52 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. AND COMPETITION
L. 983.
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relatively little attention had been paid to specific measures that
Members could take under various forms of waiver, and the practical and legal limitations that may need to be overcome to give effect
to governments’ greater scope of agency should TRIPS obligations
be temporarily eased.
These practical and legal questions are distinct from questions
concerning the necessity or propriety of a TRIPS waiver and are of
both systemic and theoretical significance. The waiver debate has
shed light on the potential application of this mechanism in the context of a global health crisis. Given the general legal legitimacy of a
waiver as a mechanism open to WTO Members,14 it cannot be excluded that further waivers may be considered as viable options to
address specific obstacles identified in response to future public
health crises.
In this article, we consider what additional options are or may
be open to Members under a public health TRIPS waiver in any one
of its current or proposed forms, and the practical considerations for
implementing each of them. We do so with a view to illuminating
both current and future possibilities for a potentially powerful, but
still not clearly elaborated, tool for access to priority medical technologies. Closely related and relevant to such practical considerations are broader, more theoretical questions about the nature of a
waiver, its legal effect, and its interaction with other international
legal instruments and with domestic law. We also explore potential
answers to such theoretical questions in the hope that they might
guide practical choices in selecting appropriate and adapted responses to public health and other crises.
Section II of this Article outlines the IP barriers said to give rise
to the need for a TRIPS waiver.15 Section III considers the nature of
the existing TRIPS waiver decisions or proposals to provide context
for the practical and legal considerations explored in Section IV.
Amongst these considerations are the domestic law mechanisms
14

See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 9, art. IX.3; see generally Isabel Feichtner, The
Waiver Power of the WTO: Opening the WTO for Political Debate on the Reconciliation
of Competing Interests, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 615, 645 (2009).
15
Our analysis of how these barriers might be overcome utilizing flexibilities within the
existing TRIPS framework, independently of a waiver, can be found elsewhere. See
Mitchell et al., supra note 4.
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needed for implementing a waiver, the role that broader domestic
legal systems might play, and the potential effect of a waiver on
other sources of international legal obligations, such as preferential
trade agreements (“PTAs”) and bilateral investment treaties
(“BITs”). In Section V, we question the security exception in Article
73(b) of TRIPS as a potential alternative to a TRIPS waiver by
focusing on its distinct legal character and limited role in the pandemic context.
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BARRIERS TO VACCINE
MANUFACTURING AND DISTRIBUTION
A.

Significance of the IP system for vaccine access
The experience of many developing countries during the pandemic has led to concerted efforts to ensure vaccine equity and future resilience by ramping up and geographically diversifying production capacity for vaccines.16 In turn, increasing and diversifying
manufacturing capacity for developed vaccines requires effective
transfer of technology, particularly for more novel vaccine platforms such as mRNA. Technology transfer may take various forms
in practice, such as:
 making use of public domain information
(including publications of patents not in force in
the countries concerned);
 a diverse range of technology licensing and
contractual arrangements; or
 close cooperative technology partnerships
entailing human capital development and direct
knowledge transfer.
These different mechanisms often involve ensuring effective access to IP-protected technologies. The development and production
of novel vaccines may also require access to IP rights covering technologies not exclusively defined by their application to a particular

16

See WHO-WTO Dialogue Steps Up Efforts for Increased COVID-19 Vaccine
Production and Equitable Access, WTO (Jul. 21, 2021), https://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/news21_e/igo_21jul21_e.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2022).
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disease, such as COVID-19, typically comprising technology platforms, production inputs and delivery technologies. These may be
held by other firms not directly involved in the development of a
specific vaccine. The IP dimension of technology transfer processes
may therefore entail licensing or transfer of patent rights, sharing of
knowhow and confidential information, and access to or reliance on
clinical trial data required for market approval of the finished product. Further, the production and distribution of vaccines may involve
technologies that utilize copyright and industrial design rights. We
briefly discuss each of these IP subject matter and their potential role
in vaccine inequity below.
B. Patents
A patent claiming a product as a protected invention gives its
owner the right to exclude third parties from making, using, offering
for sale, selling that product, and from importing the product for
those purposes; and a patent covering a process similarly gives its
owner the right to prevent third parties from using the process, and
from using, offering for sale, selling, or importing it for these purposes.17 Vaccines and vaccine manufacturing processes are often
protected by one or more patents in a number of jurisdictions.18
Thus, firms wishing to manufacture vaccines may encounter barriers
to production where the vaccine and its production processes are
protected by patents under the domestic law of the country in which
the firm seeks to exploit the invention. Similarly, patent rights
granted in an importing country can prevent the importation of

17

See TRIPS Agreement, art. 28.1.
Patent Analytics Hub identifies 1,422 applications and 290 unique patent families
filed globally since 2000 relating to human coronavirus vaccines, with 50% of these patent
families either being sought or in force. Patent Analytics Hub, Patenting of Human
Coronavirus Vaccines, ITABLEAU PUB. IP AUSTL. (Sept. 21, 2020),
https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/patent.analytics.hub/viz/Humancoronavirusvaccine
s/Vaccines [https://perma.cc/9BKE-FQJQ]; see also Mario Gaviria & Burcu Kilic, A
Network Analysis of COVID-19 mRNA Vaccine Patents, 39 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 546,
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41587-021-00912-9 [https://perma.cc/ZEK2-VANB]; Ting-Wei
(Alex) Chiang and Xiaoping Wu, Innovation and Patenting Activities of COVID-19
Vaccines in WTO Members: Analytical Review of Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) COVID19 Vaccines Patent Landscape (Vaxpal), World Trade Organization, Staff Working Paper
ERSD-2022-01 (Feb. 10, 2022).

18
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finished vaccines or production inputs without the patent holder’s
authorization.19
The factors behind inequitable access to vaccines are diverse and
interrelated, extending well beyond the scope of the IP system, and
the question of whether, and if so to what extent, IP rights have
caused vaccine inequity continues to be highly contentious.20 Patenting on inputs, processes and finished products has generally
pushed up prices for medicines,21 potentially causing effective barriers to access, but this has not necessarily been the case for COVID19 vaccines: UNICEF22 data suggests that prices have been relatively low and correlate somewhat to a national and regional income
levels. Rather, the experience with vaccine procurement during the
pandemic has led to calls for diversifying the geographical distribution of production capacity as a means of better assuring vaccine
equity and future resilience.23
Upon publication of a patent application, the invention disclosed
passes immediately into the public domain in those jurisdictions
where a patent is not sought, because of the strictly territorial scope
of patents under national and regional systems.24 Thus, most patented technology information becomes publicly available in most
WTO Members as soon as it is published, and early in the vaccine
development process (publication generally taking place eighteen

19

See Antony Taubman, Hannu Wager & Jayashree Watal, A HANDBOOK ON THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT 20 (2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2020).
20
See Sara Sousa Rosa et. al, mRNA Vaccines Manufacturing: Challenges and
Bottlenecks, 39 VACCINE 16 (2021).
21
The Doha Declaration (supra note 3) expressly recognized “concerns about [IP
protection’s] effects on prices.” See also WHO, WIPO & WTO, PROMOTING ACCESS TO
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES AND INNOVATION 198 (2d ed. 2020).
22
See COVID-19 Market Dashboard, UNICEF, https://www.unicef.org/supply/covid19-market-dashboard (last visited Oct. 30, 2022).
23
See COVAX: Key Learnings for Future Pandemic Preparedness and Response, GAVI
(Sept. 2022)
https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/covid/covax/COVAX_KeyLearnings-for-Future.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2022); Padmashree Gehl Sampath & Jon
Pearman, Local Production of COVID-19 Vaccines: A Strategy for Action, GLOBAL POL’Y
(Aug. 23, 2021) https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/articles/health-and-socialpolicy/local-production-covid-19-vaccines-strategy-action (last visited Oct. 30, 2022).
24
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 39.3
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months after the first filing data).25 The key impediment to utilizing
an invention in cases where an invention is known but not protected
is obtaining the necessary technical information to carry out the invention. In principle, a patent document must fully teach the person
skilled in the art how to implement the invention,26 and a patent can
be invalidated for insufficient disclosure.27 However, further
knowhow is typically needed to make effective use of patented technology, especially in the complex area of pharmaceuticals (particularly for new technological platforms such as mRNA vaccines28),
where it is difficult to replicate or reverse engineer detailed manufacturing knowhow.
When patents do present a barrier in countries where they are in
force, governments have considerable scope to override their exclusivity in the public interest. One flexibility that receives frequent attention is the possibility of issuing compulsory licenses or other
forms of non-voluntary use authorization (“NVUA”), such as government use orders and emergency decrees. These are interventions
by government authorities conferring on third parties the right to use
or sell an invention without authorization of the patentee, subject to
remuneration.29 The procurement scenarios that do not call for a
compulsory license or other NVUA are wide-ranging, including:
 where the product is not patented;
 where products are appropriately priced and
effectively and equitably available; and
 where necessary access has been secured, such as
through a license, or other initiatives have been
taken, such as non-assertion undertakings by the
patent holder.
25

According to WIPO data, approximately 47% of 3,276,700 patent applications filed
in 2020 were filed in high-income countries, 46% were filed in China, and only 7% were
filed in LMICs (excluding China). WIPO IP STAT. DATA CTR., www3.wipo.int/ipstats/
[https://perma.cc/E7U5-6DQE].
26
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 29.1.
27
See id.
28
See The mRNA Vaccine Technology Transfer Hub, WHO, https://www.who.int/
initiatives/the-mrna-vaccine-technology-transfer-hub [https://perma.cc/A2PF-STK6] (last
visited Oct. 30, 2022)
29
See Antony Taubman, Rethinking TRIPS: ‘Adequate Remuneration’ for NonVoluntary Patent Licensing, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 927, 932 (2008).
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While inherently diverse in their form and administration in domestic laws—a practice confirmed and clarified in the 2022 Ministerial Decision—NVUAs can be broadly classed into two categories: (i) government use authorizations, or approval for patented
technologies to be used for public purposes, and (ii) compulsory licensing in a narrower sense upon the request of a third party seeking
to use, manufacture or import patented technology or to use a patented process.30 The latter form of authorization may be granted
where the original patentee refuses to license it voluntarily, at least
where such refusal is found to be anticompetitive, or where there are
other grounds for overriding the exclusive rights of a patentee, such
as public health interests.31 Government or public use authorizations
and compulsory licenses can expand manufacturing capacity beyond the originator firm’s own production chain, and also facilitate
wider international distribution—not necessarily to introduce competition and lower-priced medicines into the market, but also as a
potential means of maximizing the use of available production capacity. This direct expansion of the production and supply of highdemand medicines may well constitute a specific public initiative,
and especially where production, procurement, or distribution is undertaken in the furtherance of government functions, this would constitute a public non-commercial use provided for in Article 31(b) of
TRIPS.32 There is little doubt that the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes a national emergency or circumstance of extreme urgency, and
the TRIPS Agreement already foresees a wide scope for governments to take relatively unencumbered action at such a time of crisis.
C. Copyright and Industrial Designs
Copyright issues with respect to written material on product information documents, product labelling, and inserts, as well as software and data compilations utilized in the vaccine manufacturing
and distribution process, also exist in the pandemic context.33
30

Id.
See WHO, WIPO & WTO, PROMOTING ACCESS TO MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES AND
INNOVATION, 236 (2020), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/who-wipowto_2020_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4XF-9UCC].
32
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 31(b).
33
See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Waiver from
Certain Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement for the Prevention, Containment, and
31
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Article 10(2) of TRIPS requires that “compilations of data or other
material . . . which by reason of the selection or arrangement of their
contents constitute intellectual creations” be protected.34 As clarified by Article 9(2), copyright protects expressions and not ideas.35
It would not normally protect individual items of data in themselves,
such as raw statistics.36
Industrial design protection safeguards the outward appearance
of manufactured products, but not the product itself.37 Thus, the
owner of a protected industrial design has the right to prevent third
parties from commercial acts of producing, selling or importing articles that bear or embody a design that copies the protected design.38 Industrial designs are likely less relevant to the manufacture
and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines than the development and
distribution of other medical products, such as diagnostic tools, ventilators, and personal protective equipment.39
Protected designs may, however, come into play for related articles: for instance, vaccines are primarily delivered through diluent
containers, single-and multidose vials and pre-filled syringes, and
transported using refrigerators, freezers, and cold boxes.40 Industrial
designs have been registered in some jurisdictions for items, such as
vaccine transportation containers and freezer, syringes and other delivery items.41 These may be procured at several points throughout

Treatment of COVID-19, WTO Doc IP/C/W/684 (Sept. 30, 2021); Doris Estelle Long, The
Overlooked Role of Copyright in Securing Vaccine Distribution Equity INFOJUSTICE (Sept.
6, 2021), http://infojustice.org/archives/43621 [https://perma.cc/VDW4-LV53].
34
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 10.2.
35
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 9.
36
See id.
37
See Taubman, Wager & Watal, supra note 19, at 127.
38
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 9.
39
See, e.g., Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Waiver
From Certain Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement for the Prevention, Containment, and
Treatment of COVID-19–Response to Questions, TRIPS, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/672 (Jan. 15,
2021); WTO Secretariat, TRIPS, the Intellectual Property System and COVID-19 (Oct. 15,
2020).
40
See Michelle R. Holm & Gregory A. Poland, Critical Aspects of Packaging, Storage,
Preparation, and Administration of mRNA and Adenovirus-Vectored COVID-19 Vaccines
for Optimal Efficacy, 39 VACCINE 457 (2021).
41
For instance, the WIPO Global Designs Database contains 457 records of designs for
syringes in Locarno Class 24 (medical and laboratory equipment), as well as several
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vaccine distribution and delivery by both private and public entities.42 However, no specific IP obstacles for access to such devices
have currently come to light (in contrast with supply chain scarcity
for vaccine inputs).43
D. Confidential Information
The protection of confidential or undisclosed information (also
termed “knowhow” or “trade secrets”) may affect access to
knowledge or information. Such access is necessary to undertake the
steps required to produce a vaccine, such as technical methods of
production or use of the equipment involved, including their precise
settings and arrangement, and biological and other materials used in
vaccine development.44
Such information and knowhow constitute core components in
the production of any vaccine, such as tacit knowledge about production methods. While much information required may be in the
public domain, some specialist knowledge is more likely to be protected as confidential in the context of newer technology platforms,
such as mRNA vaccines.45 Vaccine technologies are best understood as a package of various inputs, comprising both patented inventions and/or knowhow, some of which may be confidential.46
Even if there is no patent in force in a particular jurisdiction, or a
compulsory license or other NVUA is granted with respect to a patent, access to confidential information and related knowhow may
be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the
records of vaccine transportation and refrigeration apparatus. Global Design Database,
WIPO, https://www3.wipo.int/designdb/en/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 30, 2022).
42
WTO Secretariat, Indicative List of Trade-Related Bottlenecks and Trade-Facilitating
Measures on Critical Products to Combat COVID-19 (Oct. 19, 2021), https://www.wto.org
/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/bottlenecks_update_oct21_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/85H9-HW9E].
43
Id.
44
See Olga Gurgula & John Hull, Compulsory Licensing of Trade Secrets: Ensuring
Access to COVID-19 Vaccines via Involuntary Technology Transfer, 16 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. & PRACTICE 1242, 1246 (2021).
45
Id. at 1246.
46
See Geertrui Van Overwalle, Uncorking Trade Secrets: Sparking the Interaction
Between Trade Secrecy and Open Biotechnology, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE
SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 246, 250 (Rochelle Dreyfuss &
Katherine Strandberg eds., 2011) (forthcoming).
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technology platform.47 Technology transfer sufficient to enable generic vaccine production can, therefore, be a complex process entailing positive communication of knowledge and the development
of human capital, and the simple removal of legal barriers may not
be sufficient to achieve these outcomes.48
E. Clinical trial data
Clinical trial or test data that demonstrates the safety and efficacy of new pharmaceuticals (including vaccines) is, in some countries, required to be submitted to regulatory authorities as a condition of approval for new products and new applications.49 Such data
may also include sensitive information regarding the manufacturing
process, formulation, dosage, delivery method, indicated uses, and
general safety information.50 These regulatory procedures are distinct from the protection of IP, and many countries do not maintain
entirely independent approval processes that call for submission of
data. Many of these countries base domestic approval on approval
in other countries, or to WHO emergency use or prequalification
procedures (particularly in the context of urgent pandemic responses).51
However, in those countries where test data are required to be
submitted, such data are—under TRIPS—protected from disclosure
or unfair commercial use, provided they are undisclosed, relate to a
new chemical entity, and required considerable effort to generate.52
If firms are required to submit clinical trial data or required to rely
on the originator’s data to gain approval to distribute the vaccine,
they may be constrained from producing follow-up COVID-19 vaccines. The TRIPS standards in this area apply when the domestic

47

See Gurgula & Hull, supra note 44, at 1243.
See Padmashree Gehl Sampath & Jon Pearman, Local Production of COVID-19
Vaccines: A Strategy for Action, GLOBAL POL’Y, (Aug. 2021)
49
See, e.g., Food Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355.
50
See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 33
¶ 35.
51
See Neil McAuslane et al., Emerging Markets and Emerging Agencies: A
Comparative Study of How Key Regulatory Agencies in Asia, Latin America, the Middle
East, and Africa Are Developing Regulatory Processes and Review Models for New
Medicinal Products, 43 DRUG INFO. J. 349, 349 (2009).
52
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 39.3.
48
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authorities undertake a distinct review of clinical trial data as a condition of regulatory approval.53 Some bilateral and regional agreements provide for more extensive protection, which may expressly
set a term of exclusivity over the originator’s data, may apply to reliance on data submitted for approval in other jurisdictions, or may
set limits over reliance on the originator’s earlier regulatory approval.54 Due to relatively low costs, and growing technical expertise, recent years have seen an increasing trend of localized clinical
trials, including for COVID-19 vaccines.55
Different countries currently maintain a diverse range of approaches to both regulatory approval of vaccines (and reliance on
approval in other jurisdictions or by the WHO), and to the protection
of clinical trial data.56 Divergent regulatory mechanisms and cumbersome regulatory procedures have, in themselves, been identified
as an obstacle to the timely production and distribution of vaccines.57 Addressing this concern in the context of the pandemic, the
Ministerial Decision on the TRIPS Agreement (discussed below) articulates an understanding that TRIPS standards do not “prevent an
eligible Member from enabling the rapid approval for use of a
COVID-19 vaccine” produced under the Ministerial Decision.58
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Id.
See, e.g., Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
art. 18.5 (Mar. 8, 2018) [hereinafter “CPTPP”].
55
See Sheraz Ali et al., Clinical Trials in Asia: A World Health Organization Database
Study, 10 PERSPS. CLINICAL RSCH. 121, 122 (2019).
56
See Ellen ‘t Hoen, Protection of Clinical Test Data and Public Health: A Proposal to
End the Stronghold of Data Exclusivity, in ACCESS TO MEDICINES AND VACCINES (Carlos
M. Correa & Reto M. Hilty eds., Springer 2022) 183, 186–87; Antony Taubman, Unfair
Competition and The Financing of Public-Knowledge Goods: The Problem of Test Data
Protection, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 591, 595–96.
57
See Regulatory Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic in Southeast Asia, ORG. FOR
ECON. COOP. AND DEV., (Oct. 11,2021), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=1112
_1112857-ojsehuakia&title=Regulatory-responses-to-the-COVID-19-pandemic-inSoutheast-Asia [https://perma.cc/7N82-A62E].
58
See Ministerial Decision, supra note 11, ¶ 4.
54
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II. TRIPS WAIVER
A. TRIPS Waivers: Past, Present and Future
Concern that applicable IP rights may pose a barrier to the acceleration and diversification of production and distribution of
COVID technologies was the primary impetus for the original
TRIPS waiver proposal by India and South Africa in October 2020,
and the subsequent negotiations that ultimately led to the Ministerial
Decision adopted at the 12th Ministerial Conference.59 The original
proposal (including its subsequent revisions) and the Ministerial
Conference outcome are discussed in turn.
1. Original waiver proposal
The original waiver proposal can be anatomized into three overarching, complementary elements, with distinct legal and practical
characteristics:
(i) the suspension of obligations to provide IP
rights as such at a certain minimum standard
and to ensure exceptions and limitations to
such rights comply with certain broad principles (Part II of TRIPS);
(ii) the suspension of the obligation to provide for
the effective enforceability of covered IP
rights, including through the availability of
civil and criminal remedies, and enforcement
of rights at the border (Part III of TRIPS); and
(iii) a “peace clause” or agreement precluding
Members from enforcing and seeking compliance with TRIPS obligations through the WTO
dispute settlement mechanism.60
The original waiver proposal was subject to further revision by
its proponents, leading to a revised decision text circulated by a
communication requested by the delegations of eighteen WTO

59
60

See Revised Decision Text, supra note 8.
Id. at 3–4.
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Members and co-sponsored by over sixty Members.61 The operative
paragraph 1, which was revised “to add specificity to the decision
text following concern that the original decision text was too broad,”
would waive the obligations of Members to implement or apply Sections 1, 4, 5 and 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement or to enforce
these Sections under Part III of the TRIPS Agreement. The waiver
was to be limited to health products and technologies (including diagnostics, therapeutics, vaccines, medical devices, personal protective equipment, their materials or components, and their methods
and means of manufacture) for the prevention, treatment, or containment of COVID-19.62 Additionally, pursuant to paragraph 6 of the
proposed decision, Members would not be able to “challenge any
measures taken in conformity with the provision of the waivers
contained” in the decision under subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994, or through WTO dispute settlement
mechanisms.63
In parallel with this more general TRIPS waiver proposal, the
EU and some other Members signaled willingness to consider specific waivers of some TRIPS provisions, especially to streamline
and facilitate the use of compulsory licenses and other NVUAs, particularly in relation to patents.64 The main focus of the EU’s proposal, however, was a declaration clarifying Members’ existing
rights under TRIPS.65
By June 2022, WTO Members had failed to reach consensus on
a TRIPS waiver, including that proposed in 2020 and revised in
2021.66 Despite wide support for the proposed waiver, and a range

61

See generally id.; see also Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Waiver from Certain Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement for the Prevention, Containment
and Treatment of COVID-19—Joint Statement of Co-Sponsors, WTO Doc IP/C/W/677
(adopted May 18, 2021).
62
See Revised Decision Text, supra note 8 ¶ 1.
63
Id. at ¶ 6.
64
Communication from the European Union to the Council for TRIPS, supra, note 7.
65
See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Draft General
Council Declaration on the Trips Agreement and Public Health in the Circumstances of a
Pandemic, WTO Doc IP/C/W/681 (June 18, 2021).
66
See DG Okonjo-Iweala Urges Members to Seize Opportunity at MC12 to Deliver
Meaningful Outcomes, WTO (June 7, 2022), https://www.wto.org/english/
news_e/news22_e/gc_07jun22_e.htm [https://perma.cc/5C8H-ACJG].
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of sponsors from the developing world, discussions between WTO
Members were reportedly characterized by considerable differences.67 The matter had reportedly remained highly dynamic and the
specific outcomes uncertain, despite emerging evidence of a more
general convergence on the objective of overcoming vaccine inequities.68
2. Ministerial Decision on the TRIPS Agreement
Discussions and negotiations regarding a waiver continued
throughout 2021,69 and in December 2021, informal text-based discussions began with hopes for a “meaningful proposal” that would
be without prejudice to the negotiators’ respective positions and that
would be presented transparently to the full membership in the
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS Council”).70
The first concrete product of these discussions to surface publicly was a draft text for a proposed Ministerial Conference decision
that leaked on March 15, 2022 and contained a “TRIPS COVID-19
solution,” which took the form of numerous clarifications to the
rights and obligations under TRIPS.71 This solution was formally
presented to the TRIPS Council Chair by the WTO Director-General
and circulated to Members by the Chair’s communication dated
67

See Members Continue Discussions on IP COVID-19 Response as High-Level
Engagement
Intensifies,
WTO
(Dec.
16,
2021),
https://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/news21_e/trip_16dec21_e.html [https://perma.cc/SG5A-84S5].
68
See e.g., David Lawder, U.S. Trade Chief to Keep Pushing on Vaccine IP, WTO
Reform After Meeting Delay, REUTERS (Nov. 11, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/
world/us/us-trade-chief-tai-pushes-post-trump-vision-wto-ahead-geneva-talks-2021-1126/ [https://perma.cc/HN5X-ZPVH]; U.S. Urges All WTO Members to Support Intellectual
Property Waiver for COVID-19 Vaccines, REUTERS, (Oct. 22, 2021),
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/white-house-wto-members-must-support-intellectualproperty-waiver-covid-vaccines-2021-10-21 [https://perma.cc/YEX2-R8SR].
69
See generally Members Approach Text-Based Discussions for an Urgent IP Response
to COVID-19, WTO (June 9, 2021), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
news21_e/trip_09jun21_e.htm; TRIPS Council Agrees to Continue Discussions on IP
Response to COVID-19, WTO (July 20, 2021), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e
/news21_e/trip_20jul21_e.htm [https://perma.cc/57MK-SFNH].
70
See Richa Chintan, Leaked WTO Draft Text on TRIPS Waiver Reveals ‘Compromise’,
NEWSCLICK (Mar. 23, 2022), https://www.newsclick.in/Leaked-WTO-Draft-Text-TRIPSWaiver-Reveals-Compromise [https://perma.cc/AH57-ZS3E].
71
See id.
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May 3, 2022 (“Draft Text”).72 The Draft Text was further negotiated
and finalized before being circulated to ministerial delegates on June
10 for review and potential approval at the 12th Ministerial Conference.73 Two revisions74 of the Draft Text were published during the
course of the Conference before a “Ministerial Decision on the
TRIPS Agreement” was finally adopted on June 17, 2022 (“Ministerial Decision”).75
The first paragraphs of the Ministerial Decision state:
1. Notwithstanding the provision of patent rights
under its domestic legislation, an eligible Member may limit the rights provided for under Article 28.1 of the TRIPS Agreement (hereinafter
“the Agreement”) by authorizing the use of the
subject matter of a patent required for the production and supply of COVID-19 vaccines without
the consent of the right holder to the extent necessary to address the COVID-19 pandemic, in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of
[TRIPS], as clarified and waived in paragraphs 2
to 6 below.
2. For greater clarity, an eligible Member may authorize the use of the subject matter of a patent
under Article 31 without the right holder’s consent through any instrument available in the law
of the Member such as executive orders, emergency decrees, government use authorizations,
and judicial or administrative orders, whether or
not a Member has a compulsory license regime
72

See Council for TRIPS, Communication from the Chairperson, WTO Doc.
IP/C/W/688 (May 3, 2022) [hereinafter Draft Text].
73
See Ministerial Conference, June 12, 2022, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(22)/W/15WTO
(June 10, 2022); Draft Texts on WTO Response to Pandemic, IP Response Sent to Ministers
for Decision, World Trade Organization, (June 10, 2022), https://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/news22_e/covid_10jun22_e.htm [https://perma.cc/554R-4FNK].
74
See Ministerial Conference, Draft Ministerial Decision on the TRIPS Agreement,
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(22)/W/15/Rev.1 (June 17, 2022); Ministerial Conference, Draft
Ministerial Decision on the TRIPS Agreement, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(22)/W/15/Rev.2
(June 17, 2022).
75
See Ministerial Decision, supra note 11.
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in place. For the purpose of [the Ministerial] Decision, the “law of a Member” referred to in Article 31 is not limited to legislative acts such as
those laying down rules on compulsory licensing,
but it also includes other acts, such as executive
orders, emergency decrees, and judicial or administrative orders.76
The Ministerial Decision defines “eligible Member” as “all developing country Members,” but states that such Members with existing COVID-19 manufacturing capacity “are encouraged to make
a binding commitment not to avail themselves of the Decision.”77
This definition replaced the Draft Text definition, which referred to
“any developing country Member that exported less than 10 percent
of world exports of COVID-19 vaccine doses in 2021.”78
For the purposes of the Ministerial Decision, “subject matter of
a patent” is defined as including “ingredients and processes necessary for the manufacture of the COVID-19 vaccine,” a definition
that was chosen in place of “all finished COVID-19 vaccine products, ingredients and processes necessary for the manufacture of the
COVID- 19 vaccine.”79
The Ministerial Decision also makes the following additional
clarifications of TRIPS provisions, as well as expressly waiving the
requirements of Article 31(f):
 an eligible Member need not require the
proposed user of the subject matter of a patent to
make efforts to obtain an authorization from the
right holder as set out in Article 31(b);80
 an eligible Member may waive the requirement
of Article 31(f) that authorized use under Article
31 be predominantly to supply its domestic
market and may allow any proportion of the

76

Id.
Id.
78
See Ministerial Conference, Draft Ministerial Decision on the TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 74.
79
Ministerial Decision, supra note 11, at n.2.
80
Id. at n.3(a).
77
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products manufactured under the authorization in
accordance with this Decision to be exported to
eligible
Members,
including
through
international or regional joint initiatives that aim
to ensure the equitable access of eligible
Members to the COVID-19 vaccine covered by
the authorization;81
 determination of adequate remuneration under
Article 31(h) may take account of the
humanitarian and not-for-profit purpose of
specific vaccine distribution programs aimed at
providing equitable access to COVID-19
vaccines in order to support manufacturers in
eligible Members to produce and supply these
vaccines at affordable prices for eligible
Members . . . [and] Members may take into
consideration existing good practices in instances
of national emergencies, pandemics or similar
circumstances;82 and
 “[r]ecognizing the importance of the timely
availability of and access to COVID-19
vaccines,” Article 39.3 of TRIPS “does not
prevent an eligible Member from enabling the
rapid approval for use of a COVID-19 vaccine
produced under this Decision.”83
The Ministerial Decision also requires Members, when implementing the terms of the Decision, to:
 “undertake all reasonable efforts to prevent the
re-exportation of the products manufactured
under the authorization in accordance with the

81

Id. at n.3(b).
Id. at n.3(d). (“Includes the remuneration aspects of the WHO-WIPO-WTO Study on
Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation (2020), and the Remuneration
Guidelines for Non-Voluntary Use of a Patent on Medical Technologies published by the
WHO (WHO/TCM/2005.1).”)
83
Id. at n.4.
82
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Decision that have been imported into their
territories under th[e] Decision;”84
 “ensure the availability of effective legal means
to prevent the importation into, and sale in, their
territories of products manufactured under the
authorization in accordance with th[e] Decision,
and diverted to their markets inconsistently
with its provisions, using the means already
required to be available under the TRIPS
Agreement;”85 and
 “communicate to the Council for TRIPS any
measure related to the implementation of th[e]
Decision, including the granting of an
authorization.”86
The Decision is to have effect for five years, but the General
Council may extend that period, taking into consideration the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic.87 Within six
months from the date of the final Decision, Members must decide
on its extension to cover the production and supply of COVID-19
diagnostics and therapeutics.88 Finally, Members cannot challenge
any measures taken in conformity with the Decision under subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of Article XXIII of the GATT 1994.89
We do not seek to provide an extensive critique or analysis of
the Ministerial Decision, but draw on it to provide greater context
for discussion of its legal character and practical effect (both generally and compared to the original waiver proposal) and for insights
into the broader question of how and to what extent national government authorities can curb the exclusive effect of IP rights,

84

Id. at n.3(c). The first sentence of the analogous paragraph in the previous Draft Text
simply read: “Eligible Members shall undertake all reasonable efforts to prevent the reexportation of the COVID-19 vaccine that has been imported into their territories under the
Decision.” Draft Text, supra note 72, at ¶ 3(d).
85
Ministerial Decision, supra note 11, at n.3(c).
86
Id. at n.5.
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Id. at n.6.
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Id. at n.8.
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Id. at n.7.
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especially in a global health crisis. This latter aspect has been a consistent underlying issue in the policy debate sparked by the pandemic.90
a. Previous paragraph 3(a): Article 31(a)
The Draft Text had stated that “with respect to Article 31(a), an
eligible Member may issue a single authorization to use the subject
matter of multiple patents necessary for the production or supply of
a COVID-19 vaccine.”91 While removed by negotiators, if retained,
this sentence would have clarified what is made implicitly clear by
the text of Article 31 and paragraph 31(a) of the TRIPS Agreement:
each authorization of the use of patented subject matter must be considered on its individual merits; it is not a requirement that each individual authorization to use each specific patent must be considered
and granted on its individual merits, a restrictive approach that
would impede expeditious action, and would be inconsistent with
established practice.92 The latter, overly restrictive interpretation has
led to concerns that each authority to use must be considered and
granted on a product-by-product basis and in respect of each individual authorized user.93
Also dropped during negotiations was a requirement to “list all
patents covered” by the authorization.94 As discussed below, Article
31 does not prescribe the particular form that an authorization must
take, and it need not take the form of a compulsory license, nor does
it require all patents or patent applications affected to be identified
in advance, again consistent with established practice.95
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See Antony Taubman, Solidarity as a Practical Craft: Cohesion and Cooperation in
Leveraging Access to Medical Technologies Within and Beyond the TRIPS Agreement, 29
ASIA-PACIFIC SUSTAINABLE DEV. J. (forthcoming Dec. 2022)
91
Draft Text, supra note 72, at ¶ 3(a).
92
See, e.g, IPCom v. Vodafone [2020] EWHC (Pat.) 132 (Eng.).
93
See, e.g., WTO Doc IP/C/W/672, supra note 39, ¶3; Chang-fa Lo, Compulsory
Licensing: Threats, Use and Recent Trends, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW: SETTING THE FRAMEWORK AND EXPLORING POLICY
OPTIONS 144, 151 (Bryan Mercurio & Daria Kim eds., Routledge 2017).
94
Draft Text, supra note 72, at ¶ 3(d).
95
See The Patents Act 1997 (UK); Mitchell et al., supra note 4, at 15–16, 22.
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b. Paragraphs 1 and 3(a): Article 31(b)
That a Member has a right, in certain circumstances, to authorize
the use of patented subject matter without the need for the right
holder’s prior consent, or negotiation with that rights holder, is already provided for in Article 31(b).96 Although the exception to this
requirement in Article 31(b) is limited to cases of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, or cases of public
non-commercial use, the Ministerial Decision is limited to COVID19 vaccines, the use and sale of which would no doubt already be
covered by one of more of these conditions, noting also that the
Doha Declaration clarified both that Members have the “right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency” and that public health crises do in any
case represent such a situation.97 Hence, this clarification in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic represents a wider understanding
in the TRIPS Agreement applicable in a much broader range of circumstances than those covered by the Decision. Hence, while paragraph 2 of the Ministerial Decision is framed as being “for greater
clarity,”98 paragraph 9 also clarifies that the Ministerial Decision is
without prejudice to the interpretation of TRIPS flexibilities “outside the scope of [the] Decision.”99
c. Paragraph 2: Article 31
Paragraph 2 of the Ministerial Decision is of considerable practical significance to the extent it clarifies a frequently misunderstood
aspect of Article 31 and Section 5 of TRIPS, and thus directly addresses a commonly observed obstacle to the full use of patent flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement. Paragraph 2 clarifies that
NVUAs need not be affected through existing compulsory licensing
laws, and may be given effect by means of any instrument available
in the law of a Member, whether or not that Member has a compulsory license regime in place.100 While paragraph 2 refers to “government use authorizations” in addition to executive orders,
96
97
98
99
100

See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 31(b).
Doha Declaration, supra note 7, ¶5(c).
Ministerial Decision, supra note 11, at n.2.
Id. at n.9.
Id. at n.2.
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emergency decrees and judicial or administrative orders, each of
these instruments are more accurately characterized as different species of government use authorizations.101
As is often overlooked, government NVUAs can be issued on
various grounds and need not expressly refer to a patent at all: Article 31(b), for instance, makes clear that for public non-commercial
use, the government or contractor need not make a patent search before undertaking the authorized use of patented subject matter.
NVUAs may take the form of a specific license under a patent (i.e.
a compulsory license), or a more general authorization.102 This is
because Article 31 does not formally speak of compulsory licenses
or any specific form of license. Instead, it sets out principles and
requirements that govern any non-voluntary authorized use of patented subject matter, beyond the exceptions covered by Article 30.
d. Paragraphs 3(b), 3(c) and 5: Article 31(f)
The sole true waiver of TRIPS provisions in the Ministerial Decision, contained in paragraph 3(b), is of the requirement in Article
31(f) of TRIPS that authorized use by a Member under Article 31
be predominantly for the supply of the Member’s domestic market.103 Additionally, footnote 3 to the Ministerial Decision, which
did not previously appear in the Draft Text, provides that “[i]n exceptional circumstances, an eligible Member may re-export
COVID-19 vaccines to another eligible Member for humanitarian
and not-for-profit purposes, as long as the eligible Member communicates in accordance with paragraph 5.”104
The effect of paragraph 3(b) and footnote 3 of the Ministerial
Decision is to provide a streamlined means for vaccine production
predominantly for export as an alternative to the System set up Article 31bis of TRIPS (the solution called for in Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration). The key differences are (i) a switch to a supplydriven model of production for export, which is potentially more responsive to pandemic circumstances because receiving countries

101
102
103
104

Id. at n.2.
See id. at 16.
Id. at n.3(b).
Id.
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need not first notify their import requirements; (ii) a postponement
of notification requirements until after shipments take place; (iii) entitlement to supply “international or regional joint initiatives that
aim to ensure the equitable access of eligible Members to the
COVID-19 vaccine covered by [an] authorization”, creating an additional avenue for supply suitable for pandemic circumstances that
would not be directly available under Article 31bis (while this is
procedurally possible through the relatively simple step of aggregating demand and submitting a joint notification of needs, the pandemic waiver enables a more nimble and responsive pathway);105
and (iv) re-exportation of COVID-19 vaccines by importing eligible
Members “for humanitarian and not-for-profit purposes”, an additional flexibility responding to the circumstances of the pandemic.106
e. Paragraph 3(d): Article 31(h)
Paragraph 3(d) of the Ministerial Decision provides that the determination of adequate remuneration under Article 31(h) of TRIPS
may take account of the humanitarian and not-for-profit purposes of
specific vaccine distribution programs “in order to support manufacturers in eligible Members to produce and supply these vaccines
at affordable prices for eligible Members,” and a footnote refers to
remuneration guidance earlier published by several international organizations.107 While not redefining or replacing existing flexibilities accorded to them under TRIPS, this provision may afford
greater confidence to Members in incorporating humanitarian considerations into their adequacy determinations, but it should not be
seen as the source of their power to do so.
f. Paragraph 4: Article 39.3
The Ministerial Decision adds some clarity to what was paragraph 4 of the Draft Text, which was phrased much more broadly in
the following terms: “[n]othing in Article 39.3 . . . shall prevent a
Member from taking measures necessary to enable the effectiveness

105
106
107

Mitchell et al., supra note 4, at 28–38.
See Ministerial Decision, supra note 11, at n.3(d) .
See id., n.3(d), at n.4.
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of any authorization issued as per this Decision.”108 Aside from clarifying what the “effectiveness” of a Decision-based authorization
amounts to (rapid regulatory approval of vaccines), there are no substantive differences between these two wordings.109 Both provisions
add little to the following flexibilities already contained in TRIPS:
test data need only be protected against “unfair commercial use,”
which naturally excludes both non-commercial use and commercial
use that is not “unfair” (including, as we have argued elsewhere, use
that is equitably remunerated)110; and test data need not be protected
against disclosure, where a lack of such protection is deemed necessary to protect the public.111
g. Paragraph 9: “without prejudice”
The Decision does not displace existing options Members have
under the TRIPS Agreement, its paragraph 9 expressly providing
that the Decision is:
. . . without prejudice to the flexibilities that Members have under the TRIPS Agreement, including
flexibilities affirmed in the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, and without
prejudice to their rights and obligations under the
TRIPS Agreement, except as otherwise provided for
in paragraph 3(b).112
While paragraph 9 further provides that the Decision does not
prejudice “the interpretation of the above-mentioned flexibilities,
rights and obligations outside the scope of this Decision,” it does
arguably shed light indirectly on the range of practical options generally available under TRIPS.113 We have referred to these flexibilities briefly in the foregoing discussion, but a full survey and examination of them within the pandemic context can be found elsewhere.114
108
109
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111
112
113
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Draft Text, supra note 72, at n.4.
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B. The Legal Character, Implications and Limitations of a Waiver
1. The scope and legal character of a pandemic waiver
The Ministerial Decision is distinctly different in scope and application to the original waiver proposed in 2020: it addresses vaccine technology only (with a process under way to potentially extend
it to therapeutics and diagnostics);115 it focuses on patent rights and
means of curtailing their exclusive effect along with the role of clinical trial data protection, but does not address other areas of IP; it
seeks to provide positive normative guidance and not merely to suspend legal standards; and its waiver element is precisely focused on
specific obstacles potentially posed to the use of COVID-19 technologies, rather than a broad, non-specific removal of legal obligations. This section examines the legal character and potential implications of both the original waiver proposal and the Ministerial Decision, as well as considerations relevant to their practical implementation.
In contrast to the relatively limited scope of the Ministerial Decision, the initial and revised COVID waiver proposals would suspend a wide range of obligations under TRIPS and thus open up options for various measures at the domestic level that—by definition—would not otherwise be available to Members with TRIPScompliant laws and legal systems. Options canvassed in the debate
have included suspending intellectual property right (“IPR”) protection over COVID-19-related material, designs and inventions; halting the processing of applications for protection, such as new
COVID-19 technologies; and creating wider exceptions to IP rights
than are currently understood to be available under TRIPS.116 In
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See WTO, TRIPS Council Welcomes MC12 TRIPS Waiver Decision, Discusses
Possible Extension (July 6, 2022), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news22_e/
trip_08jul22_e.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2022).
116 See, e.g., Council for Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Law, Minutes
of Meeting, WTO Doc. IP/C/M/98 (July 30, 2018); Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
International Property Law, Minutes of Meeting, WTO Doc. IP/C/M/99 (May 11, 2019);
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Law, Minutes of Meeting,
WTO Doc. IP/C/M/100 (Oct. 20, 2021); Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
International Property Law, Minutes of Meeting, WTO Doc. IP/C/M/101 (July 23, 2021);
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Law, Minutes of Meeting,
WTO Doc. IP/C/M/102 (Oct. 5, 2021); Council for Trade-Related Aspects of International
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addition to the suspension of domestic IP claims and WTO dispute
resolution mechanisms discussed above, the waiver proposal as revised in June 2021 would prima facie allow Members, at least in
principle, to:117
 prevent the grant or recognition of otherwise
eligible IP rights;
 prevent the processing of otherwise legitimate
applications for patents or industrial designs to
the extent that they cover relevant COVID-19
subject matter;
 refuse to grant protections and patents over
designs and inventions, or suspend existing ones,
again to the extent that they cover relevant
COVID-19 subject matter;
 discriminate in the enjoyment of patent rights on
the grounds of field of technology;
 provide exceptions to IP rights that are broader
than Articles 13, 26 and 30 would otherwise
allow;
 determine that normal remedies for infringement
of legitimate IP rights are not available in respect
of certain COVID-19-related acts (such as
vaccine production);
 suspend certain procedural steps that would
otherwise be required for the grant of compulsory
licenses and other NVUAs, such as:
o disregarding the need to subsequently
notify the right holder in the event of
commercial use (Article 31(b));
o permitting production mainly for export
and not domestic use without the
Property Law, Minutes of Meeting, WTO Doc. IP/C/M/103 (Feb. 24, 2022); see generally
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Law, Response to Questions
on Intellectual-Property Challenges Experienced by Members in Relation to COVID-19 in
Document IP/C/W/671, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/673 (Jan. 15, 2021); Council for Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Minutes of Meeting, ¶ 92, WTO Doc IP/C/M/103
(Jan. 6, 2022) (particularly the reproduced documents cited in the oral status report to the
General Council which had been circulated in document JOB/IP/53).
117 See generally Revised Decision Text, supra note 8, ¶ 1.
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requirements of 31bis being satisfied
(31(f)); and
o suspending an obligation to compensate
the right holder, including through ex post
remuneration (31(h)); and
 permit uses of undisclosed information and
clinical trial data in ways that would otherwise
constitute dishonest commercial practices
(Article 39.2)118 or unfair commercial use
(Article 39.3).119
A waiver proposal of this scope can be analyzed both in terms
of its means of implementation and practical consequences at the
domestic level and in terms of its operation within the international
legal framework established by the Marrakesh Agreement. In undertaking this analysis, we do not seek to advocate or promote any of
the specific options that would be formally or theoretically opened
up by a broadscale waiver, or the far-reaching policy questions
about the impact, practicality and wider legitimacy of adopting such
measures. The domestic implementation of TRIPS waivers also
potentially raises complex practical questions not touched on in
our analysis, such as its application to platform or multi-use technologies.
A waiver of WTO obligations under Article IX:3 is one of three
legislative competences of the Ministerial Conference under the
Marrakesh Agreement, alongside the power to adopt authoritative
interpretative decisions (Article IX.2) and the power to adopt
amendment decisions (Article X.1).120 A WTO waiver is typically
characterized as a temporary exception to WTO obligations, rather
than a positive source of rights or obligations. Some reasons given
are that waivers only apply in “exceptional circumstances;”121 they
apply only to particular Members and certain obligations; and they

118

See Antony Taubman, Fair Enough? Reconciling Unfair Competition with
Competition Policy, in COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN TODAY’S
GLOBAL ECONOMY (Robert Anderson et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2021).
119 See Taubman, supra note 56, at 595–96.
120
See Feichtner, supra note 14, at 618.
121 See James Harrison, Legal and Political Oversight of WTO Waivers, 11 J. OF INT’L
ECON. L. 411, 419–420 (2008); Feichtner, supra note 14, at 620.
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are distinct from WTO tribunals’ relatively limited jurisdiction over
the Covered Agreements.122 On this view, waivers do not create substantive rights, except to the extent they permit action by Members
that would otherwise be prohibited by a waived obligation, and suspend the possibility of a complaint being filed under the WTO’s dispute settlement system. In this sense, a waiver is a shield that can be
used against any relevant claim raised and not a sword that can be
used as the basis for a claim.
There are few procedural or substantive requirements for a valid
waiver: the waiver must be adopted in “exceptional circumstances”
by consensus of the Ministerial Conference within 90 days of submission, or otherwise by a three-fourths majority.123 The fact that a
waiver is expressly stated to be a response to “exceptional circumstances” would likely suffice to establish their existence, as a recital
to that effect would reflect the collective view of the Membership as
a whole. For this reason, both the original waiver proposals and the
Ministerial Decision begin by noting “the exceptional circumstances
of the COVID-19 pandemic.”124
While the validity of a TRIPS waiver is unlikely to be challenged on such procedural or substantive grounds, more fundamental questions arise about the extent to which each of the waivers proposed or adopted align with how a WTO waiver is intended to function.
The original waiver proposed was designed as something much
broader than a source of immunity or defense that could be relied
upon in WTO dispute settlement. As outlined above, by expressly
seeking to waive international obligations to protect and enforce IP
rights through national laws, it was intended to open up positive avenues for limiting the scope, availability, and enforcement of IP
rights at the domestic level, alongside the suspension of dispute resolution at the multilateral level. In contrast, as we have noted, the
Ministerial Decision both: (i) provides positive normative support
for the wider use of governments’ existing entitlements under the
TRIPS Agreement, through clarification of their practical
122
123
124

See Harrison, supra note 121.
See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 9, art. IX ¶3.
Ministerial Decision, supra note 11.
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implementation; and (ii) creates an additional array of domestic options, through its waiver of the Article 31(f) restriction on production under an NVUA predominantly for the domestic market, thus
furnishing Members with an additional means of pharmaceutical
production for export alongside Article 31bis.125
The clear contrast between the scope and character of the Ministerial Decision with the scope and character of the original waiver
proposal underscores not only the wide range of mechanisms that
may be available in principle, but also the value of analyzing the
sharply different implications they have for practical implementation. Equally, the stark empirical fact—albeit the subject of much
critical commentary126—is that, in this instance, a very open, broadbrush waiver could not be successfully negotiated whereas a more
precise and focused one could.127 This state of affairs touches on a
broader policy question about the function of such waivers, and
whether they should be framed as a broad, prophylactic measure to
inoculate against a wide range of potential domestic barriers, or
whether they should be crafted and focused to address particular legal difficulties encountered when framing, planning or undertaking
specific domestic actions. To use the medical analogy, should a
waiver be a broad-spectrum vaccine to protect against potential
problems in a general way; or should it be a therapy to be applied
once a more precise diagnosis of the legal problem has been undertaken? The question is more than theoretical: it touches also on the
potential complexities and uncertainties of domestic implementation, as well as the practicality of reaching a timely consensus across
the WTO’s broad Membership.

125

See Ministerial Decision, supra note 11, 3(b).
See Statement, South Centre, TRIPS Waiver: An Insufficient Multilateral Response.
TRIPS-Consistent National Actions are Called for (June 21, 2022),
https://mailchi.mp/southcentre/southnews-south-centre-statement-trips-waiver-aninsufficient-multilateral-response-trips-consistent-national-actions-are-called-for
[https://perma.cc/KV7Z-M76J]; Médecins Sans Frontières, COVID-19 Tools is a
Disappointing Failure for People (June 17, 2022), https://www.msf.org/lack-real-ipwaiver-covid-19-tools-disappointing-failure-people [https://perma.cc/BDZ3-TW7E].
127 See generally Peter Yu, The COVID-19 TRIPS Waiver and the WTO Ministerial
Decision, in IPR IN TIMES OF CRISIS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
(Jens Schovsbo ed., 2022) (forthcoming 2023), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=4150090 [https://perma.cc/4V8A-FMT2].
126
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2. Limitations of a TRIPS waiver
Both the original waiver proposal and the Ministerial Decision
share limitations that inhere within waivers more broadly. First,
there are some issues that a waiver cannot address at all. For example, a waiver would not alleviate the challenges surrounding the
forced disclosure of confidential information.128 There would also
be no or negligible benefit in waiving certain TRIPS provisions that
already provide Members with latitude to impose higher standards
than TRIPS requires. For example, Article 29 provides for a minimum standard of disclosure that Members may choose to surpass in
their domestic law. It is also noteworthy that all LDC WTO Members are not required to apply any substantive provisions of TRIPS
until at least July 2034,129 and so even the broad waiver proposal
would not add to the flexibility already extended to them.
Moreover, a waiver—however implemented—would not in itself dispense with regulatory requirements or procurement procedures relating to vaccines and other pharmaceuticals because such
matters are not directly governed by TRIPS nor by the IP system
generally.130 Thus, a waiver could not overcome any obstacles to
vaccine production, distribution and export that relate to the market
approval of medicines from a safety and efficacy perspective. This
suggests that regulatory questions would need to be addressed in
conjunction with the implementation of a waiver. The controversy
over the supply to Bolivia of vaccines by the Canadian firm Biolyse
clearly illustrates this point. Bolivia has concluded an agreement
with Biolyse for the supply of vaccines and has notified its needs for
vaccines to the TRIPS Council as required for an Article 31bis license for production for export.131 However, as at the time of
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See Thambisetty et al., supra note 13, at 17; RETO M. HILTY ET AL., COVID-19 AND
ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: POSITION STATEMENT OF THE MAX PLANCK
INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 3 (2021).
129
See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of
the Transition Period under Article 66.1 for Least Developed Country Members: Decision
of the Council for TRIPS of 29 June 2021, WTO Doc IP/C/88 (June, 29 2021).
130 See RETO M. HILTY ET AL., supra note 128.
131
See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Notification of
Need to Import Pharmaceutical Products Under the Special Compulsory Licensing System,
WTO Doc. IP/N/9/BOL/1 (May 11, 2021).
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2022]

TRIPS WAIVER FOR COVID-19 VACCINES

133

writing, a compulsory license has not been issued,132 and the Canadian Government has not taken the prior step of adding the vaccine
to Schedule 1 of Canada’s Patent Act,133 required for a compulsory
license for export under the Canadian Access to Medicines Regime
(CAMR). While details of the matter are currently unclear and have
been the subject of some controversy,134 one reported issue has been
the need for Canadian government authorities to establish that vaccines produced by Biolyse would be safe and effective: thus a
spokesperson for the Canadian Government’s Innovation, Science
and Economic Development program stated that “[a] company seeking authorization under Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime must
be able to manufacture the drug and conduct necessary trials to establish that the drug meets Canadian safety and efficacy requirements before authorization would be granted”.135 This is ultimately
a regulatory matter and not an IP issue, even though the ostensible
obstacle to production appears to be the lack of a license. If there is
an undischarged obligation to confirm that the firm can produce vaccines that meet regulatory standards, this situation would remain the
case under a waiver, even if Canada were to take steps to suspend
IP rights pursuant to it, because these steps in themselves would not
remove regulatory standards applied to medicines. It would be possible, of course, for governments to elect to permit vaccines to be
produced expressly for export without complying with domestic
regulatory standards, although governments may prove hesitant to
permit production and export of vaccines that would not comply
with their own domestic standards. In any event, this regulatory dimension would need to be considered and addressed, with or without, and before, after or during, a waiver addressing only the IP dimension. It has been suggested that political reluctance may also be
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See Benjamin Blanco, With One Simple Decision, The Canadian Government Can
Save Lives, Aljazeera (Sept. 28, 2021) https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/9/28/thecanadian-government-can-save-bolivian-lives (last visited Oct. 30, 2022).
133
Canada, Patent Act R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4.
134 See, e.g., M
UHAMMAD ZAHEER ABBAS, CANADA’S POLITICAL CHOICES RESTRAIN
VACCINE EQUITY: THE BOLIVIA-BIOLYSE CASE 11 (2021).
135 See Zachary Brennan, How to Manufacture COVID-19 Vaccines Without the Help of
J&J, Pfizer or Moderna? Biolyse Sees the Difficulties Up Close, ENDPOINTS NEWS (May
17, 2021), https://endpts.com/how-to-manufacture-covid-19-vaccines-without-the-helpof-jj-pfizer-or-moderna-biolyse-sees-the-difficulties-up-close/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2022).
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a factor behind the failure to schedule COVID-19 vaccines and then
issue a CAMR compulsory license:136 if that is the case, in the event
of a TRIPS waiver, it does not automatically follow that a government would take the more controversial step of applying domestic
measures beyond the bounds of TRIPS, as against using an existing
mechanism that is legally established137 and widely supported.138
Finally, while the original waiver could entitle Members to reduce the terms of IP rights or revoke such rights altogether, the timelimited character of a waiver and the possibility of domestic legal,
procedural, and other constraints may complicate such steps. For example, there could be legal and procedural difficulties in reinstating
rights or titles over IP subject matter such as patents and industrial
designs that have been revoked. We discuss these specific limitations below, in the context of waiver implementation.
C. Implementing a Waiver
As TRIPS is not self-executing, and IP rights are defined, administered, and enforced under domestic law, any waiver of TRIPS
provisions at the international level would not lead directly to any
curtailment or suspension of IP rights or their enforcement. For governments to take advantage of a waiver would require implementation at the domestic level—whether through a legislative amendment or other executive or administrative action.139
Some discussion of the waiver proposal seems to have been
predicated on the assumption that a waiver of TRIPS obligations
amounts to an automatic waiver or suspension of IP rights as such.
Thus, a waiver has been seen as a fast-track approach to overcoming
136

See Evidence, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International
Development, House of Commons, Canada Number 019, 1st Session, 44th Parliament (9
May, 2022); Ahmar Khan, Canada Lacks ‘Political Will’ to Waive COVID-19 Vaccine
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NEWS,
Oct.
6,
2021,
https://globalnews.ca/news/8243635/bolivian-minister-canada-covid-vaccine-waiver/
(last visited Oct. 30, 2022).
137 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 31(b).
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As of September 1, 2022, the amended TRIPS Agreement applied to 136 of 164 WTO
Members. See TRIPS Council, Annual Review of the Special Compulsory Licensing
System, IP/C/94 (forthcoming).
139 See Carlos M. Correa, TRIPS Agreement and Access to Drugs in Developing
Countries, 3 INT’L L.J. HUMAN RIGHTS 25, 32 (2005).
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IP barriers to access that would be swifter and more immediate than
domestic processes (e.g. NVUAs).140 However, even in jurisdictions
with a strong tradition of “direct effect” of international treaty law,
and despite a number of judicial decisions directly applying TRIPS
in the absence of implementing legislation,141 we are unaware of any
legal mechanism that would lead directly from a waiver of TRIPS
obligations to the effective absence or unenforceability of IP rights
under domestic law. Further systemic research may be needed to
clarify this situation, as it is a key aspect of understanding a TRIPS
waiver as a practical tool for both current and future scenarios.
Further, current waiver proponents have emphasized the potential diversity of national mechanisms for implementing a waiver. As
observed by waiver proponents, “there is no [one] size fits all approach to national implementation,” given the distinct nature of each
Member’s legal and constitutional system.142 However, if a waiver
is intended to promote greater coordination and cooperation between governments in the spirit of solidarity, then a highly heterogeneous approach to implementation in different national systems
may impede any potential benefits while consuming considerable
administrative or legislative bandwidth and political capital.
Here, we provide a general overview of the potential mechanisms for implementing the original waiver proposed as revised in
June 2021. In order to highlight some relevant practical considerations, we outline what each of these options might mean for Australia, as an example of a Member with a highly developed IP system, a high level of engagement at the international level, and a complex constitutional system, and we contrast this analysis with a range
of selected jurisdictions in the Asia Pacific region.
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See Academic open letter, supra note 13; WTO Doc IP/C/W/672, supra note 39,
¶¶143–49.
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See Mark Miller, Trips Agreement and Direct Effect in European Community Law:
You Can Look . . . But Can You Touch, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 617–19 (1999).
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Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 39, ¶
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1. Peace Clause: Suspension of International Dispute
Resolution
The original COVID waiver proposal, as analyzed above, would
have suspended the availability of multilateral dispute resolution
alongside the formal waiver of the obligation to give effect to
TRIPS’ specific provisions. Various forms of agreement to suspend
or refrain from taking certain action in international dispute resolution are known informally as “peace clauses.” These are generally
concluded on the understanding that the agreement may lead to
greater domestic willingness to take actions that would otherwise
infringe, or purportedly infringe, international obligations. Past
WTO practice has been somewhat diverse in this respect and can be
characterized according to two broad categories of measure:
(i) agreements to altogether exclude certain disputes from the scope of multilateral dispute settlement; and
(ii) agreements to exercise restraint in initiating
dispute settlement proceedings.
An example of the first category in the context of TRIPS is the
exclusion of non-violation and situation complaints, initially under
Article 63.2 and subsequently through successive Ministerial Conference decisions. The second type is exemplified in Article 24.1 of
the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”), which provides that “Members shall exercise due restraint in raising [dispute
settlement] matters involving a [LDC] Member” and that “complaining parties shall exercise due restraint” in seeking compensation or retaliation against an LDC.143 However, the original waiver
proposal would clearly provide for agreement on a prohibition of
dispute settlement as such, and not simply due restraint.
A peace clause of some kind would entail Members foregoing
what would otherwise be a political choice to invoke their rights under the DSU to instigate dispute procedures against another WTO
Member; it would not require formal legal change at the domestic
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WTO Agreement: Dispute Settlement Understanding, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S.
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level. If, as one of us has explored,144 practical agency of national
governments and their willingness to pursue pragmatic options may
be partly guided by a risk assessment as to the consequences of dispute settlement action, this mechanism may provide reinforcement
for taking potentially difficult choices, while not in itself creating
distinct options per se.
From a practical perspective, it is noteworthy that dispute settlement complaints taken in particular by developed countries against
developing country Members have been minimal since around the
year 2000.145 Further, the current absence of an operational WTO
Appellate Body (“AB”) means that any outcome arising from panel
proceedings is potentially suspended through the possibility of “appeal into the void.”146 The uncertainty over whether, when, and how
this state of affairs may be resolved would presumably lead to some
reluctance to take significant domestic action, especially to build up
vaccine production capacity.
As we have already explored earlier in this article, it is not clear
whether a “peace clause” would taint the character of a “waiver”
under Article IX:3. A decision under Article IX:3 is a decision to
waive obligations of one or more Members—it is not an agreement
or understanding to refrain or abstain from dispute resolution.
2. Suspension of domestic enforcement action
Potential mechanisms for blunting Part III obligations under
TRIPS include removing available remedies such as injunctive or
interlocutory relief and limiting other remedies. For example, this
may involve setting a cap on available compensation or remedies for
infringements relating to COVID-19 subject matter. While the focus
would be on waiving Part III of TRIPS, removing or limiting remedies may also be achieved by defining exceptions to IP rights under
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See Antony Taubman, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO WORKING WITH TRIPS 92 (Oxford
Univ. Press, 2011).
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[https://perma.cc/9XUW-ALP7].
146 See Chad P Brown & Petros C Mavroidis, Is This the End?: The WTO Case Law of
2019, 20 WORLD TRADE REV. 383, 383 (2019).
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Part II of TRIPS in terms of a lack of capacity to enforce such rights
(e.g. regulatory review exceptions).
The suspension or modification of enforcement action for
COVID-19 subject matter would not be without practical limitations. In Australia, for example, it would require at least an amendment to various enforcement mechanisms found in Australia’s statutory IP law and various general law entitlements to bring enforcement action against the disclosure of confidential information on the
basis of contractual or equitable principles. As discussed in the next
two sections, such mechanisms would also raise questions under domestic constitutional law and the possibility of violations under
other international agreements.
3. Temporary suspension of IP legislation
Some TRIPS waiver advocates have contemplated the suspension of existing IP rights or the suspension of the processing of patent and other applications.147 This would entail removing the legal
effect, registration, or recognition of IP rights that would otherwise
legitimately be recognized or made available. This may be contrasted with the suspension of domestic enforcement action, because
it would preclude or delay the grant or registration of instruments
that constitute the source of certain exclusive IPRs (e.g. patents, registered industrial designs, and copyright registrations). In some jurisdictions, executive action may be sufficient to implement this,
while in others, it would be necessary to enact some form of legislation. Proponents of a waiver have maintained that legislative
amendment “need not be a time-consuming exercise.”148
However, practical difficulties would likely interfere with this
approach. For instance, in the patent field, a number of critical technologies are platform technologies with much wider application
than COVID-19 alone.149 This gives rise to related issues about the
difficulty of managing these patents and patent applications. Would
they be revoked, suspended, or refused purely due to their
147

See, e.g., Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra
note 39, ¶ 80.
148
See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 33,
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149 See generally Chiang & Wu, supra note 18.
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application to COVID-19? Would administrative or judicial authorities have the capacity to determine the applicable scope of a platform technology to COVID-19 vis-à-vis other medical indications?
Similar considerations would arise in respect to other technologies
such as vaccine storage, transportation, and delivery. While use patents (which might be defined in terms of use of a technology to
address COVID-19 in particular) would be more easily addressed
by this kind of mechanism, they would not enable a complete solution in many cases if other broader technology platforms remain part
of the access equation.
D. Conflict or waiver of laws?
1. Constitutional questions
Even where a TRIPS waiver would permit certain action under
TRIPS, constitutional principles may limit governments’ capacity to
take such action lawfully at the domestic level. Depending on the
jurisdiction concerned, the removal or modification of enforcement
rights or remedies, the unremunerated use of IP subject matter or
test data or the forced disclosure of confidential information could
conceivably constitute takings of property for which no just or reasonable compensation has been provided. Much would depend on
the constitutional language used and the existing body of law that
governs its meaning and interpretation.
The Australian case of JT International v. Commonwealth of
Australia illustrates how these factors can be determinative of specific outcomes. 150 In JT International, the plaintiffs claimed that
Australia’s plain packaging laws effected the acquisition of property
other than on just terms, contrary to section 51(xxxi) of Australia’s
Constitution.151
The court found that restrictions on the use of trademarks
brought about by Australia’s Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011
(Cth) did not constitute an “acquisition of property” for the purposes
of section 51(xxxi), because the Commonwealth did not acquire any

150
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JT Int’l SA v. Commonwealth of Australia, [2012] 250 CLR 1 (Austl.).
Id. at ¶ 47.
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property.152 Instead, the Commonwealth merely placed limitations
on relevant trademark owners’ negative rights to prevent the unauthorized use of their trademarks by third parties.153 It was significant
that such limitations did amount to a “taking” of the plaintiff’s intellectual property but that they did not “involve the accrual of a
benefit of a proprietary character to the Commonwealth.”154 The intellectual property rights were property for the purposes of section
51(xxxi), and were taken from the plaintiffs by force of the TPP Act,
but did not create in the Commonwealth a proprietary relationship
in the tobacco product packaging or the rights that inhered in it.155
The constitutions of some other Asia-Pacific countries, selected
for comparative discussion, contain similar taking provisions. However, these provisions utilize various formulations and would likely
be subject to differing interpretations or applications in different circumstances, such as in the context of controls,156 limitations on
rights as in JT International, or in the context of non-voluntary use
(Table 1). For example, the terms “requisition” and “use” found in
the constitutions of Bangladesh, Malaysia and Nepal are likely to
cover the non-voluntary use of IP rights or test data, as well as the
forced disclosure of confidential information.157
Regulation that interferes with IP rights in a manner akin to Australia’s plain packaging laws is more likely to be prima facie captured by a provision like India’s, which refers to the “deprivation”
of property.158 A deprivation does not necessarily require a corresponding acquisition of the same property or the accrual of a corresponding benefit by another party.159 Similarly, as has been demonstrated by a line of investor-state dispute settlement arbitration decisions, the term “expropriation,” as found in the constitutions of
Cambodia and Nepal, can be interpreted in different ways, and may
include the mere deprivation of an economic benefit even where no
152
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taking occurs.160 This is not to suggest that plain packaging laws in
India might be successfully challenged on any of these bases, as India’s Constitution contains several nuances that would likely play a
role in any defense of plain packaging measures.161 Rather, these
nuances are demonstrative of the constitutional complexities that exist across different jurisdictions and that must be considered on a
case-by-case basis in the context of health measures, including in
the implementation of a COVID-19 or other public health waiver.
These examples illustrate how different constitutional systems
may impact the effective implementation of a broad-scope waiver
across numerous jurisdictions. However, these are not necessarily
insurmountable issues that need to be resolved at the international
level prior to agreement on a waiver. Instead, they should signal a
need for governments to consider how more general waiver provisions might be implemented with a degree of refinement at the domestic level, to ensure that measures operate compatibly with the
domestic legal environment in which they are to have effect.
Table 1. Constitutional “taking” provisions in the Asia-Pacific
Country

Constitutional requirement

Australia

The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to
make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to . . . (xxxi) the acquisition of property
on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in respect
of which the Parliament has power to make laws.162

Bangladesh

Any acquisition, nationalization or requisition of property must
be compensated by an amount and in a manner specified by law,
but the adequacy of that compensation cannot be questioned.163

160
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Republic of Kenya, Case No. ARB/15/29, Award, ¶ 323 (ICSID Oct. 22, 2018).
161
See, e.g., India Const. art. 19, cl. 2; see generally Amit Yadav et al., Plain Packaging
of Tobacco Products: The Logical Next Step for Tobacco Control Policy in India, 3 BMJ
GLOBAL HEALTH 5 (2018).
162 Australia Constitution s 51(xxxi).
163 Bangladesh Constitution § 42.
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Cambodia

“Expropriation from ownership” must be exercised in the public
interest as provided by law and subject to the payment of fair and
just ex ante compensation.164

India

Substantial deprivations of property must be done in accordance
with law, for a public purpose, and be compensated.165

Malaysia

The compulsory use or acquisition of property must be accompanied by adequate compensation.166

Nepal

An acquisition or requisition of, or encumbrance created on, property must be in the public interest and be subject to compensation,
the basis of which must be prescribed by law.167

Thailand

“Expropriation” of property must be for public interest purpose
and subject to the payment of fair compensation.168

Vietnam

In cases made absolutely necessary by reason of national defense,
security or national interest, in case of emergency and for protection against natural calamity, the State can make a forcible purchase of or can requisition pieces of property of individuals or
organizations against compensation, taking into account current
market prices.169

2. Broader international obligations
The TRIPS Agreement is not, of course, the sole source of individual Members’ international obligations relating to the protection
of IP in their domestic systems. It follows that the temporary suspension of TRIPS obligations does not necessarily create full freedom of choice to wind back, limit or suspend IP rights in national

164

Cambodia Constitution art. 44.
India Const. art. 31A, supra note 162; see Dwarkadas Srinivas of Bombay v. The
Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co., 1954 AIR 119 (1953) (Ind.); The State of West
Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, 1954 AIR 1954 SC 92 (1953) (Ind.).
166 Malaysia Constitution art. 32.
167
Nepal Constitution s 25, cl. 2-3.
168 Thailand Constitution s 42.
169 Vietnam Constitution art. 32.
165
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systems. A complex matrix of overlapping regional trade and economic agreements is a source of further IP protection standards that
may have a bearing on vaccine manufacture and distribution options.170 This section reviews some systemic considerations relevant
to these agreements.
a. Other multilateral conventions
The TRIPS Agreement itself refers to and applies several of the
multilateral IP conventions administered by the World Intellectual
Property Organization (“WIPO”). The most significant for present
purposes are the Berne Convention and the Paris Convention, foundational elements of international IP law that are substantively incorporated into TRIPS,171 but also separately and independently adhered to by almost all WTO Members.172 Article 2 of TRIPS provides that “[n]othing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations” under, inter alia, the Paris and Berne
Conventions.173
On the face of it, a waiver covering Part II, Section 1 of TRIPS
(on substantive copyright protection) would address the obligation
in Article 9 of TRIPS to comply with Articles 1 to 21 of the Berne
Convention, provisions that provide the bulk of substantive TRIPS
law on copyright. A waiver covering Parts II and III of TRIPS may
also engage the obligation in Article 2 to comply with Articles 1
through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris Convention, “[i]n respect
of” Parts II, III and IV of TRIPS. This is especially relevant to certain standards on compulsory licensing of patents174 and the protection of undisclosed information and clinical trial data, the latter of

170

See Raymundo Valdés & Maegan McCann, Intellectual Property Provisions in
Regional Trade Agreements: Revision and Update, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND
THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 497–607 (Rohini Acharya ed., 2016).
171 See Antony Taubman, ‘Trade-related’ After All? Reframing the Paris and Berne
Conventions as Multilateral Trade Law, in ACROSS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 129–43
(Graeme W. Austin et al. eds., 2020).
172 See WIPO, S
TATES PARTY TO THE PCT AND THE PARIS CONVENTION AND MEMBERS OF
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wipo.int/pct/en/paris_wto_pct.html
[https://perma.cc/UL2E-2W68] (last updated Apr. 6, 2022).
173
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 2.
174 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as last revised at the
Stockholm Revision Conference, art. 5A, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583.
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which is framed in TRIPS as an implementation of Article 10 of the
Paris Convention.175
The implications of a waiver of TRIPS provisions for a country’s
separate and parallel obligations under the Paris and Berne Conventions have not been fully explored. However, many LDCs are parties
to both these treaties while also benefiting from both extensions of
time for the implementation of, and specific waivers under,
TRIPS.176 The closest analogy that has arisen in WTO practice has
been the authorization by the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”), in
three dispute settlement cases, for some Members to suspend various elements of IP protection for nationals from the Members concerned otherwise required under TRIPS as a remedy for their failure
to implement dispute settlement findings.177 In turn, this has raised
the issue of whether, and if so on what legal basis,178 the DSB’s authorization should flow through to suspending relevant obligations
separately under the Paris and Berne Conventions.
In the first case, which concerned Ecuador’s complaint against
the European Communities (“EC”) (as it was then called) regarding
the import and sale of bananas, the arbitration decision found that
Ecuador may request obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, “to
the extent that suspension requested under the GATT and the
GATS . . . is insufficient to reach the level of nullification and

175

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 39.
For example, Bangladesh is a signatory of the Berne Convention and Paris
Convention, and as an LDC, also benefits from the extension of time for implementation
of the TRIPS Agreement. See Council for TRIPS, supra note 129.
177
Decision of the Arbitrators on European Communities, Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas—Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities
under Article 22.6 of the DSU, ¶173, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (adopted Mar. 24,
2000) [hereinafter EC–Bananas–Recourse to Arbitration]; Decision of the Arbitrators on
United States, Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services—Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, ¶5.7,
WTO Doc. WT/DS285/ARB (adopted Dec. 21, 2007); Decision of the Arbitrators on
United States, Subsidies on Upland Cotton— Recourse to Arbitration by the United States
under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, ¶5.230, WTO Doc.
WT/DS267/ARB/1 (adopted Aug. 31, 2009).
178 For an extensive discussion, see Conference Paper, Antony Taubman, ‘Self-Help,’
Justified Disobedience and the Suspension of TRIPS Obligations, WORKSHOP ON INTELL.
PROP. ORDERING BEYOND BORDERS (Ctr. Intell. Prop. & Info. L. (CIPIL) et al. 2019) (copy
on file with authors).
176
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impairment indicated.”179 This finding raised the question of the relation between the suspension of TRIPS obligations and the conventions administered by WIPO.
The Arbitrators noted that the parties disagreed on whether the
non-derogation provision that is Article 2.2 of TRIPS “prevents or
permits the suspension of TRIPS obligations which have a relation
to” the cited WIPO conventions: the Paris and Berne Conventions,
the Rome Convention and the Treaty on Intellectual Property of Integrated Circuits (“IPIC Treaty”).180 However, they observed that
Article 2.2 only refers to Parts I to IV, and not Part V of TRIPS,
which contains provisions on “Dispute Prevention and Settlement.”
Based on their reading of Article 64 of TRIPS and Article 22.3 of
the DSU, the Arbitrators concluded that suspension of certain
TRIPS obligations was consistent with all the requirements of Article 22 of the DSU and that “no other provision of the WTO agreements indicate that an authorization by the DSB of that request
would in theory be prohibited under WTO law.”181
The Arbitrators did not consider that their jurisdiction under the
DSU extended to determining whether a Member’s suspension of
certain TRIPS obligations, on the DSB’s authorization, would be inconsistent with that Member’s international obligations arising from
treaties other than WTO agreements (e.g. the Paris, Berne and Rome
Conventions, which Ecuador had ratified).182 They concluded that it
is “if at all, entirely for Ecuador and the other parties to such treaties
to consider whether a specific form chosen by Ecuador for implementing such suspension of certain TRIPS obligations gives rise to
difficulties in legal or practical terms under such treaties.”183
This discussion represents the most extensive analysis in WTO
decisions concerning the implications of cross-retaliation for separate legal obligations under WIPO conventions. In the ensuing DSB

179

Decision of the Arbitrators on European Communities, Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas—Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities
under Article 22.6 of the DSU, ¶173, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (adopted Mar. 24,
2000) [hereinafter EC–Bananas–Recourse to Arbitration].
180 Id. ¶ 148.
181
Id. ¶ 151.
182 Id. ¶ 152.
183 Id.
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debate, the EC expressed concerns about the Arbitrators’ “flexible
interpretation of the procedural provisions of the DSU, [particularly]
with regard to due process considerations” and “the way the Arbitrators had addressed the possible use of cross-retaliation in general
and its application to TRIPS, in particular, when taking into account
the specific nature of [IPRs].”184 The EC expected “a stronger reasoned argument as a basis for authorizing retaliatory measures under
one agreement when the violation occurred under another.”185 However, the consequence of non-compliance with WIPO conventions
was left unmentioned.
International treaty law, in particular the law on countermeasures, does at least in principle provide for certain avenues for reconciling a suspension of WIPO treaty obligations in the context of dispute settlement.186 We identify the following as some of the relevant
legal issues that could arise in the context of an agreed TRIPS
waiver: (i) the character of a waiver decision as a “subsequent agreement” under Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (“VCLT”); (ii) the principle of estoppel; and (iii) the apparent consent of the parties to the consequences of such a waiver,
as well as the expectation that the waiver decision should be effective in practice.187 Some of these issues are further elaborated upon
later in this article.
b. Bilateral and regional trade agreements
A TRIPS waiver may also raise similar questions relating to
Members’ obligations under the numerous bilateral and regional
PTAs that provide substantive obligations to protect IP. Almost all
of the PTAs in force between WTO Members have been concluded
subsequently to TRIPS. While a waiver of TRIPS provisions would
naturally increase IP flexibilities at the international level, various
PTAs may increase Members’ obligations while diminishing their
rights and flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement, as initially
184

Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Ctr. William Rappard on
April 7 2000, ¶ 38, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/78 (May 12, 2000).
185 Id.
186
See Taubman, supra note 178.
187 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(a), opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter “VCLT”].
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drafted.188 Bilateral and regional obligations relating to IP take diverse legal forms, including:
 direct, general reaffirmations of TRIPS
obligations;189
 separate bilateral obligations to protect and to
enforce IP rights to a certain level, without
express reference to TRIPS; and
 specific ‘TRIPS-plus’ obligations, which either
elaborate on or extend certain TRIPS provisions
(e.g. by limiting grounds for compulsory
licensing of patents).190
An additional factor, not present in the Paris and Berne Conventions, is the availability of dispute settlement proceedings under
most of these agreements. Although WTO panels and the Appellate
Body have tended to interpret Article 3.2 of the DSU as limiting
“their ability to derive any exceptions to WTO law from inter se
agreements, or from any international obligations not having a multilateral character,”191 this provision and its interpretation by WTO
bodies are unlikely to apply similarly to extra WTO disputes, where
the basis of a claim is a bilateral or plurilateral trade obligation that
is temporarily waived at the WTO.
In the event that Members seek to implement a more expansive
TRIPS waiver in their domestic systems, they may be confronted
with claims that there have been breaches of such separate trade
agreements. While this may extend to the prospect of dispute settlement under these agreements, we consider that there is a slim likelihood of actual disputes being brought in the context of a temporary

188

See Andrew D. Mitchell & Tania Voon, Patents and Public Health in the WTO, FTAs
and Beyond: Tension and Conflict, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 571, 596 (2009).
189 See e.g., CPTPP, supra note 54, art. 18.50.3.
190
See e.g., Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-U.S., May 18, 2004 [2005] A.T.S 1, art.
17(9)(7); see generally, Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends,
in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 215, 231 (Lorand Bartels
& Federico Ortino eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2006).
191
Geraldo Vidigal, From Bilateral to Multilateral Law-making: Legislation Practice,
Evolution and the Future of Inter Se Agreements in the WTO, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1027,
1043 (2013).
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measure to address a pandemic, particularly given the very low rate
of dispute settlement under such agreements thus far.
However, should these issues arise, there are several avenues or
approaches to addressing potential legal implications, including
those relevant to substantive obligations and their potential enforcement through dispute settlement action. These include:
 the specific reference, in some PTAs, to public
health exclusions under TRIPS, such as
references to the Doha Declaration, as well as
side letters concluded to this effect;192
 the consent of the parties that is implicit in a
WTO agreement on a waiver, which could be
argued to flow through to bilateral obligations on
the basis that the waiver could not be effectively
implemented if overlapping bilateral obligations
supervened;193
 potential reliance on the VCLT;194 and
 the principle of estoppel.195
Article 1.1 of TRIPS may be seen at first blush to provide a
mechanism for resolving treaty conflicts that could apply to a TRIPS
waiver and PTAs. Article 1.1 provides that “Members may, but shall
not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection
than is required by this Agreement, provided that such protection
does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.”196 However,
Article 1.1 applies to “more extensive protection” that is implemented in Members’ domestic law, rather than international standards agreed to by PTA parties under an inter se agreement.197 Thus,
rather than relegating the status of PTA provisions below those of a

192

See e.g., CPTPP, supra note 58, arts. 18.6.1, 18.50.3.
For an overview of “consent” in international law-making, see Samantha Besson,
State Consent and Disagreement in International Law-Making: Dissolving the Paradox,
29 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 289, 295–96 (2016).
194 See infra Part III.D.3.
195
See infra Part III.D.4.
196 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 1.1.
197
Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, From TRIPS to FTAs and Back: Re-Conceptualising the
Role of a Multilateral IP Framework in a TRIPS-Plus World (Max Planck Inst. for
Innovation and Competition Rsch. Paper No. 18-02, 2018).
193

2022]

TRIPS WAIVER FOR COVID-19 VACCINES

149

waiver, Article 1.1 simply clarifies Members’ entitlement to implement in their domestic laws higher standards of protection than the
minimum standards of protection that TRIPS provides.198
c. Bilateral investment treaties
In addition to claims under trade agreements, the suspension or
cancellation of IP rights could lead to a claim that BIT obligations
are infringed, either as an illegitimate expropriation of IP rights or
on the basis of procedural fairness or fair and equitable treatment.199
Numerous BITs expressly include IP as a protected asset.200 Under
fair and equitable treatment, investors might claim to have had their
reasonable expectations frustrated by a significant alteration to the
domestic legal environment.201 Many BITs provide for dispute settlement, including the possibility of investor-state dispute settlement.202 One investor’s unsuccessful case concerned a company’s
claim that a trend of judicial decisions had thwarted legitimate expectations as to the availability of IP rights.203
As Mercurio and Upretti note, it is important to distinguish between a waiver of TRIPS obligations, which would not violate trade
obligations, and domestic State action to waive or temporarily alter
investors’ IPRs, which may amount to a violation of international
investment law commitments.204 While a waiver is a temporary
measure in the WTO context, domestic law implementing a waiver
may well amount to a total alteration of the legal framework, at least

198

See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 1.1.
See generally, Prabhash Ranjan, TRIPS Waiver: A BIT of a Challenge for India, WIRE
(May
22,
2021),
thewire.in/trade/trips-waiver-a-bit-of-a-challenge-for-india
[https://perma.cc/B6NY-DZK3].
200
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Investment Policy Hub
identifies 2794 BITs, and 424 Treaties with Investment Provisions (TIPs), a majority of
which have some coverage of IP rights, either expressly or implicitly. See Investment
Policy Hub, International Investment Agreements Navigator, UNCATD,
investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements
[https://perma.cc/RBU8-MG45].
201 See generally Bryan Mercurio & Pratyush Nath Upretti, The Legality of A TRIPS
Waiver for COVID-19 Vaccines Under International Investment Law, 71 INT’L & COMPAR.
L. Q., 323 (2022).
202
See id. at 324.
203 Eli Lilly and Co. v. The Gov’t of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2 (Mar. 16, 2017).
204 Mercurio & Upretti, supra note 201.
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with respect to IPRs that apply to COVID-19 vaccine technologies.
As the Ministerial Decision has little effect on existing TRIPS provisions and thus limited scope for alteration of domestic laws, it is
very unlikely to form the basis of a legitimate expectations claim.205
However, a broader waiver that allows for the full suspension of
certain IP rights would be more susceptible to a successful legitimate expectations claim under fair and equitable treatment (assuming such expectations are found to be legitimate).
BIT negotiators have foreseen the possibility of a compulsory
license amounting to an expropriation of assets under a BIT, and
therefore a number of BITs expressly clarify that compulsory licensing in compliance with TRIPS is permitted. For instance, a recent
BIT provides that its provisions on expropriation do not apply “to
the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in relation to [IPRs], or
to the revocation, limitation, or creation of [IPRs], to the extent that
such issuance, revocation, limitation, or creation is consistent with
TRIPS Agreement.”206 However, this suggests that issues may arise
should NVUAs not be, or taken not to be, TRIPS-consistent. We
have not been able to identify any provision that expressly addresses
the question of a separate waiver of TRIPS obligations. On one conceivable view, the TRIPS Agreement may be taken by a tribunal as
it is found at the date of the claim, such that an alteration to IP rights
that is consistent with a waiver of relevant TRIPS provisions is ipso
facto consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.207
The answer is perhaps somewhat clearer in cases where BIT provisions refer much more broadly to consistency with “international
agreements on intellectual property,”208 or “multilateral agreements
in respect of . . . [IPRs] to which the contracting Parties are parties.”209 Although a model agreement, Canada’s Foreign Investment
Promotion and Protection Agreement Model is plainly explicit, as it

205

Id. at 336.
Ass’n of Se. Asian Nations [ASEAN], Special Admin. Region Investment Agreement,
art. 10, ¶ 5, Dec. 11, 2017.
207
See supra section IIID3(i).
208 See, e.g., Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment,
Colom.-U.A.E., art. 7, Nov. 12, 2017.
209 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, Jap.-Papua N.G., art. 19,
¶ 2, Apr. 26, 2011.
206
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refers to measures “consistent with the TRIPS Agreement and any
waiver or amendment of that Agreement accepted by that Party.”210
Given the distinctive character of a TRIPS waiver—as a temporary measure at a time of a global health crisis—it may prove unlikely that actual cases would be pursued, whether by governments
or affected investors. Moreover, BIT provisions that carve out obligations in situations of national emergency may also be invoked. For
instance, some recent BITs provide that “[n]on-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety
and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.”211
That said, the potential avenues discussed above in relation to PTAs
may also be open to governments whose domestic implementation
of a pandemic waiver becomes subject to challenge under one or
more BITs.
3. VCLT
Certain VCLT provisions may provide greater clarity around the
interaction between a TRIPS waiver and other international economic agreements. Resolving conflicts between a waiver and rights
and obligations subsisting in these agreements may be reduced to
resolving inconsistencies between different international treaties in
force between the same parties. This situation is partly addressed by
Article 30.2 of the VCLT, which reads: “when a treaty specifies that
it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with,
an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.”212 Moreover, where a treaty does not contain that specification, Articles 30.3 and 30.4(a) have the combined effect of sustaining the application or effect of the earlier treaty to the extent it is
compatible with a later treaty between the same parties on the same
subject matter.213
Potentially relevant to the interpretation and application of Article 30.2 are Articles 40 and 41.1 of the VCLT, which concern the
210

Canada’s 2021 Model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement
(FIPA), art. 9, ¶ 6.
211
Canada, Consolidated Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP], Annex 9-B, art. 3, ¶ b (2016).
212 VCLT, art. 30.2.
213 VCLT, arts. 30.3, 30.4.
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amendment of multilateral treaties and agreements to make inter se
modifications to a treaty respectively. Pursuant to Article 41.1:
[t]wo or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty
may conclude an agreement to modify the treaty as
between themselves alone” if:
(a) the possibility of such a modification is provided for by the treaty; or
(b) the modification in question is not prohibited
by the treaty and:
(i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other
parties of their rights under the treaty or
the performance of their obligations;
(ii) does not relate to a provision, derogation
from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.214
Additionally, Article 57 allows for the suspension of the “operation of a treaty in regard to all the parties or to a particular party”
provided it is done in conformity with the provisions of the treaty or
at any time by consent of all the parties after consultation.215 Article
58 allows treaty parties to suspend provisions of a treaty inter se if
requirements similar to those in Article 41.1 are satisfied.216
Notwithstanding its undoubted legitimacy, it is unclear whether
a WTO waiver made pursuant to Article IX.3 but not incorporated
into a WTO Agreement as a formal amendment constitutes either:
(i) a “treaty” for the purposes of Article 30.2 (either becoming subsumed under the WTO
Agreement itself, or a separate treaty);
(ii) an “amendment” for the purposes of Article 40;
(iii) an inter se “modification” for the purposes of
Article 41; or
(iv) a “suspension” for the purposes of Articles 57–
58.217
214
215
216
217

VCLT, art. 41.
VCLT, art. 57.
VCLT, art. 58.
VCLT, art. 30.2, 40–41, 57–58.

2022]

TRIPS WAIVER FOR COVID-19 VACCINES

153

This characterization is important because it may determine
whether a waiver takes priority over the provisions of another earlier
or subsequent agreement. Therefore, we first consider the legal status of a TRIPS waiver specifically for the purposes of these VCLT
provisions, before discussing how each might operate to resolve
conflicts between a waiver and non-WTO agreements.218
It is worth reiterating that the TRIPS Agreement is not a
standalone agreement, but is instead just one of the Multilateral
Trade Agreements219 or Covered Agreements annexed to, and that
form parts of, the Marrakesh Agreement.220 Each must be read consistently with one another, and the general procedural and interpretative rules set out in the Marrakesh Agreement must be applied in
carrying into effect or interpreting any one of its Annexes (unless
otherwise provided for elsewhere in the Agreement).221 For the purposes of this section, we refer to the Marrakesh Agreement and the
TRIPS Agreement separately, to distinguish the latter from the main
treaty text.
a. TRIPS waiver: “treaty”, “amendment”, “modification” or
“suspension” under the VCLT?
A “treaty” under the VCLT means “an international agreement
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or
more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.”222 It is clear from this definition that a “treaty” may be constituted by more than one instrument, provided these instruments are
“related.” Presumably, the instruments must be so “related” as to
constitute “an . . . agreement” between States, as opposed to numerous separate agreements. It is unclear whether “related instruments”
need to be contemporaneous with one another; however, it is likely
218

That a waiver can be likened to the forms of treaty revisions referred to in the VCLT
is made implicit by the Appellate Body. See Appellate Body Report, Peru—Additional
Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS457/AB/R (July 20,
2015) [hereinafter Peru—Agricultural Products]. To our knowledge, this has not been
discussed in any great detail.
219 See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 13, art. II, ¶ 2.
220
See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 13.
221 Id. at art. II.
222 VCLT, art. 2(a).
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that the reference in Article IX.3 to a waiver decision of the Ministerial Conference is sufficient to bring any such decision within the
scope of a “related” instrument for VCLT purposes.
On this interpretation, the TRIPS Agreement, encompassing any
subsequent waiver of its provisions under an Article IX.3 decision,
may amount to a composite “treaty” for VCLT Article 31.2 purposes. A WTO waiver’s legal and functional nature as a source of
immunity in the context of dispute settlement223 may cast doubt on
this conclusion because a waiver may then be characterized simply
as a separate agreement that affects the means of enforcing the
TRIPS Agreement, but that does not form part of the treaty itself.
However, this would overlook the fact that the TRIPS Agreement
and the procedural provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement form
part of one integrated treaty, and that a treaty’s legal force generally
lies in the means of its enforcement rather than the content of its
substantive provisions.
In Australia—Tobacco Plain Packaging, the Panel considered
that paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration may be considered a “subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty or the application of its provisions” for the purposes of
Article 31.3(a) of the VCLT.224 In reaching this conclusion, the
Panel had regard to the Appellate Body’s conclusion in US—Clove
Cigarettes that:
[b]ased on the text of Article 31(3)(a) . . . we consider that a decision adopted by Members may qualify as a “subsequent agreement between the parties”
regarding the interpretation of a covered agreement
or the application of its provisions if: (i) the decision
is, in a temporal sense, adopted subsequent to the relevant covered agreement; and (ii) the terms and content of the decision express an agreement between

223

See Feichter, supra note 14; Harrison, supra note 121.
Panel Report, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical
Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and
Packaging, ¶ 7.2409, WTO Doc. WT/DS457/R (adopted June 28, 2018) [hereinafter
Australia—Plain Packaging].
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Members on the interpretation or application of a
provision of WTO law.225
The Panel considered that the Declaration is a “declaration,” rather than a “decision,” but that it was “adopted by a consensus decision of WTO Members, at the highest level . . . subsequent to the
adoption of the WTO Agreement, Annex 1C of which comprises the
TRIPS Agreement.”226 According to the Panel, the terms and contents of the decision adopting the Doha Declaration expressed an
agreement between Members on the approach to be followed in interpreting the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. The AB subsequently clarified that it was unnecessary to determine whether the
Declaration was a “subsequent agreement” because paragraph 5(a)
of the Declaration reflects customary international law rules of
treaty interpretation.227
Notwithstanding that instance of judicial restraint, it is not inconceivable that a WTO waiver could constitute a “subsequent
agreement” under Article 31.3(a) of the VCLT. If so, it is possible
that it would not be captured by the term “treaty” used in Article
30.2 and therefore would not be taken as having priority for those
purposes. However, a waiver being characterized as “subsequent
agreement” would not thereby necessarily preclude it from being a
part of the relevant “treaty.” A treaty may be embodied in more than
one instrument, and Article 31.2 provides that the context for the
purpose of interpreting a treaty shall comprise “any agreement” or
“any instrument” made in connection with the conclusion of the
treaty, indicating that such terms are not mutually exclusive.
Article 40 concerns the “amendment” of multilateral treaties.228
Amendments are dealt with separately from waivers under Article
X of the Marrakesh Agreement. As has been noted in the WTO context, the “complexity of Article X . . . reveals the prudence and
thoughtfulness of contracting parties when they considered how the
225

Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove
Cigarettes, ¶ 58, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted Apr. 4, 2012).
226
Id.
227 See Andrew David Mitchell & Theodore Samlidis, The Implications of the WTO
Tobacco Plain Packaging Disputes for Public Health Measures, 70 INT’L & COMPAR. L.
Q. 1011, 1025 (2021).
228 VCLT, art. 40.
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covered treaties could be amended.” 229 Thus WTO negotiators saw
it fit to prescribe distinct rules of procedure for amendments and
waivers.
Aside from being at odds with the internal logic and framework
of the Marrakesh Agreement, the characterization of a TRIPS
COVID-19 vaccine waiver as an amendment to the WTO Agreement is at odds with the way in which a waiver functions as an immunity to a claim of violation.230 A waiver under Article IX.3 does
not take the substantive character of an “amendment” within the ordinary meaning of that term as used in the VCLT because it is not a
positive alteration of the treaty terms. In our view, it is a limited
suspension of the rights and obligations arising from those terms,
which is provided for by the treaty text. In any case, assuming that
a waiver did constitute an “amendment” for Article 40 purposes, Article 40 would provide little assistance in resolving relevant conflicts. Article 40 primarily governs the procedural requirements for
amendments and their effect for States who do not become a party
to the amending agreement.231
Article 41 was intended by VCLT drafters to prevent inter se
modifications to multilateral agreements undermining the object and
purpose of those agreements.232 It is highly questionable that a
waiver constitutes a modification at all, and also that a mechanism
provided for by the treaty could be capable of undermining its own
object and purpose. Nevertheless, placing these fundamental difficulties aside, the requirement in Article 41.1(a) that the modification
be provided for by the treaty text is clearly satisfied by the presence
of Article IX.3 of the Marrakesh Agreement. Moreover, although
text-based negotiations for a waiver (like any WTO decision) have
229

Tarcisio Gazzini, Can Authoritative Interpretation Under Article IX:2 of the
Agreement Establishing the WTO Modify the Rights and Obligations of Members?, 57
INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 169, 175 (2008).
230 See Hunter Nottage & Thomas Sebastian, Giving Legal Effect to the Results of WTO
Trade Negotiations: An Analysis of the Methods of Changing WTO Law, 9 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 989, 1001 (2006).
231
VCLT, art. 40.
232 See Kerstin Odenhal, Article 41: Agreements to Modify Multilateral Treaties Between
Certain of the Parties Only, in VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A
COMMENTARY 719, 720 (O. Dörr & K. Schmalenbach eds., 2018). See VCLT, art.
41(1)(b)(ii).
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been carried out on the basis of consensus, a waiver under Article
IX.3 is theoretically only for the benefit of certain Members (notwithstanding the possibility that obligations may be waived for all
Members233).
However, it is very difficult to properly characterize a WTO
waiver as an agreement between only certain parties, or an agreement to “modify the treat as between [those parties] alone” because:
 any decision made by the Ministerial Conference
is made by the Conference as a single authority
that is representative of all Members—either by
consensus or by majority vote;234
 an agreement to waive WTO obligations may not
necessarily only be between the same Members
whose obligations are waived (for example, a
decision to waive obligations is effectively that
of all Members, but may only apply to LDCs);
and
 the decision operates to waive only certain
Members’ obligations, but it is binding on and
affects all Members, as all Members are denied
the opportunity to enforce those obligations.
It is both contrary to the initial purpose of Article 41 and inconsistent with the terms of Article IX.3 to characterize a WTO waiver
as an inter se modification. Instead, Article 41.1 was intended and
is very likely to capture bilateral or plurilateral agreements that share
the same parties and cover the same subject matter as a multilateral
treaty (e.g. PTAs/BITs).
Article IX.3 of the Marrakesh Agreement has been explicitly
identified as an example of a treaty provision that permits the “suspension” of a treaty for VCLT Article 57 purposes.235 Article IX.3
could well be an example of a provision that permits the suspension

233

See Mitchell & Voon, supra note 188, at 581.
Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 9, art. IX.1.
235 See Thomas Giegerich, Article 57: Suspension of the Operation of a Treaty Under Its
Provisions or by Consent of the Parties, in Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A
Commentary, in VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 993,
1061, 1065–66 (O. Dörr & K. Schmalenbach eds., 2018).
234
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of the “operation” of a treaty, even if only partially. In any case, it
would not be inconsistent to characterize Article IX.3 as a provision
that provides for suspension, and a WTO waiver as a suspension of
the operation of a treaty, while also characterizing the Ministerial
decision, being the instrument effectuating that suspension, as an
“instrument” that forms part of a “treaty” for Article 30 purposes.
Articles 57 and 30 operate independently of one another—one governs internally the operation of a treaty, while the other governs externally the priority of application between different, conflicting
treaties.236
Ultimately, the preceding analysis does not provide a clear answer as to the true characterization of a WTO waiver for VCLT purposes. However, it does show that, despite this uncertainty, these
VCLT provisions can operate harmoniously with one another in various circumstances. Their operation in the context of a waiver is explored in the next sections.
b. Article 30.2 of the VCLT
Article 30.2 only applies when a treaty specifies that it is “subject to or not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or
later treaty.”237 Importantly, many PTAs and BITs clarify that they
are not in derogation of, or prejudicial to, the rights and obligations
that its parties have under the WTO or TRIPS Agreement, and some
go further by clarifying that this applies to the WTO Agreement as
amended or modified from time to time.238 The prima facie consequence is that PTAs/BITs with provisions clarifying the primacy of
the WTO Agreement are unlikely to override the effect of a TRIPS
waiver, assuming that a TRIPS waiver forms part of the “treaty” under Article 30.2 and can properly be considered as such together
with the TRIPS Agreement. The waiver would take priority over the
TRIPS-plus or waiver-inconsistent provisions in PTAs/BITs that
contain these clarifications. This would appear to be so even if the

236

See Kerstin Odenhal, Article 30: Application of Successive Treaties Relating to the
Same Subject Matter, in VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY
504, 508 (O. Dörr & K. Schmalenbach eds., 2018).
237 VCLT, art. 30.2.
238 See e.g., CPTPP, supra note 54, arts. 1.2.1, 1.3 n.2; see also supra note 210.
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PTA/BIT constituted a valid modification of the TRIPS Agreement
under Article 41.1.
However, determining which treaty is the earlier or later has
been done by looking to the date of its adoption, its entry into force,
or its ratification by or for each of the parties.239 If that approach was
followed, it would subordinate a novel waiver of TRIPS provisions
below that of a PTA or BIT that had been adopted, entered into force
or ratified subsequently to TRIPS. The same would apply where a
PTA or BIT contained no such clarification about which treaty prevails, as Article 30.4(a) gives priority to a later treaty in the event of
any inconsistency. In such cases, the only available recourse might
be to establish that the economic agreement in question, or one or
more of its provisions, is not a valid modification under Article 41.1.
Article 30 would also be of little assistance where a waiver
merely removed the possibility of dispute resolution with respect to
certain obligations, but that possibility continued under a PTA/BIT.
A non-WTO tribunal would have to decide whether a lack of jurisdiction elsewhere is justification for denying its own: “whether it
could disapply the treaty which provides the principal terms of reference for its own jurisdiction.”240 Tribunals have somewhat artificially framed such questions in terms of whether the treaties and
their enforcement systems have the “same subject matter.”241 Article
41.1 and dispute resolution are discussed further below in sections
D3(iii) and D4.
c. Article 41.1 of the VCLT
As concluded above, a WTO waiver itself is very unlikely to
constitute an inter se modification of the TRIPS Agreement under
Article 41.1. Rather, Article 41 was intended to address PTAs/BITs
239

See Odenhal, supra note 236, at 509; EW Vierdag, The Time of the ‘Conclusion’ of a
Multilateral Treaty: Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and
Related Provisions, 59 BRITISH YEARBOOK INT’L L. 75, 92 (1988); Claude Chase, Norm
Conflict Between WTO Covered Agreements—Real, Apparent Or Avoided? (2012) 61
INT’L & COMPAR. L. Q. 791, 799–800.
240
See Alexander Orakhelashvili, Article 30 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties: Application of the Successive Treaties Relating to the Same Subject-Matter, 31
ICSID REV. 344, 361.
241 See, e.g., Eastern Sugar BV v. The Czech Republic, SCC Case No. 088/2004, ¶ 180
(Mar. 27, 2007); see generally id. at 357.
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that cover the same subject matter as a multilateral agreement to
which its parties are signatory. The question that arises in this context is whether a given PTA/BIT constitutes a valid modification of
the TRIPS Agreement under Article 41.1, having regard to the
TRIPS Agreement as altered by a waiver.
With respect to Article 41(1)(a), Article XXIV:5 of GATT 1994
allows modification of the WTO Agreements as between FTA parties. However, such modifications are unlikely to fall within the ambit of Article 41(1)(a), as they are limited to MFN treatment.242 Nevertheless, the TRIPS Agreement does not appear to prohibit inter se
modifications, meaning the opening condition of Article 41(1)(b) is
satisfied.243
Whether a PTA does not affect the enjoyment by other parties
of their rights under the treaty or performance of their obligations
(pursuant to Article 41(1)(b)(i)) would depend on the rights and obligations in question. Assuming that those rights include rights
waived under an Article IX.3 waiver:
FTA provisions that diminish the flexibilities granted
by the TRIPS Agreement in connection with . . .
compulsory licensing may not meet the conditions of
Article 41(1)(b)(i) and (i) of the VCLT. Limiting
rights to grant compulsory licenses under Article 31
of the TRIPS Agreement (as interpreted and extended by the Declaration and the Decision) might
appear to affect only the FTA parties themselves. In
fact, this would also potentially affect the enjoyment
by other WTO Members of their rights to benefit
from compulsory licenses (contrary to Article
41(1)(b)(i)), particularly if the FTA parties are potential exporters under the system established by the Decision. Further, derogation from the provisions in the
TRIPS Agreement granting flexibility with respect

242

See Mitchell & Voon, supra note 188, at 596–97. For contrary discussion on this point
in a non-TRIPS context, see Thomas Cottier & Marina Foltea, Constitutional Functions of
the WTO and Regional Trade Agreements, in REGULATORY TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE
WTO SYSTEM, 43, 55 n.39 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006).
243 See Mitchell & Voon, supra note 188, at 596–97.
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to . . . compulsory licensing . . . is arguably incompatible with the effective execution of the object and
purpose of the TRIPS Agreement, contrary to Article
41(b)(ii).244
While these comments were made in the context of the Decision
establishing the Paragraph 6 System (at a time when it had not been
formally incorporated into TRIPS), we see no reason why they
should not apply equally in respect of a new waiver for COVID-19
vaccines. Furthermore, test data exclusivity period may also affect
countries not party to a PTA but that rely on a PTA party or parties
for regulatory approval.245
With respect to Article 41(1)(b)(ii), certain FTA rights and obligations “can deny core flexibilities essential to ensure that TRIPS
does not prevent WTO Members from protecting public health” and
thus potentially undermine the objectives in Articles 7 and 8 of
TRIPS.246 In this regard, it is difficult to see how PTA/BIT provisions that are inconsistent with a waiver would not already be inconsistent with the objectives in Articles 7 and 8.
d. Applicability of the VCLT to WTO waivers
The AB’s Report in Peru—Agricultural Products adds a layer
of complexity to this already convoluted picture. In that dispute, the
Appellate Body considered that specific provisions addressing
amendments, waivers, or exceptions for regional trade agreements
in the Marrakesh Agreement (i.e., Articles IX and X, and Article
XXIV of the GATT 1994) provide a lex specialis that prevails over
the VCLT’s general provisions, including Article 41.247
As one commentator has noted, the AB’s decision in Peru—Agricultural Products is far-reaching because it “may imply that all
types of the listed WTO carve-outs override Article 41”
244

See id. at 598.
See Ruse-Khan, supra note 197.
246 See id. at 51.
247
See Appellate Body Report, Peru—Additional Duty on Imports of Certain
Agricultural Products, ¶¶ 5.111–5.113, WTO Doc. WT/DS457/AB/R (July 20, 2015); see
generally Sherzod Shaikhodjaev, The ‘Regionalism vs Multilateralism’ Issue in
International Trade Law: Revisiting the Peru–Agricultural Products Case, 16 Chinese J.
INT’L L. 109, 115 (2017).
245
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notwithstanding that Article 41” covers inter se revisions, but not
unilateral waivers or treaty amendments affecting all parties.”248
Ruse-Khan suggests that, because TRIPS does not contain provisions akin to Article XXIV of GATT or Article V,” the door is open
[in the TRIPS context] to resort to the general rule in Article 41
VCLT.”249 This conclusion is questionable because it disregards the
unity that the Marrakesh Agreement shares with each of its Annexes, including the TRIPS Agreement.250
Two important considerations potentially affect the relevance of
Peru—Agricultural Products for present purposes. First, the more
specific provisions in the Marrakesh Agreement do not seem to provide particular solutions to the conflict of laws issues outlined in
previous sections of this article, and therefore no lex specialis in the
sense identified by the AB.
Second, as a TRIPS waiver would relinquish Members of certain
obligations under TRIPS, rather than create more onerous obligations, one of only very few circumstances in which these hierarchical provisions are likely to be invoked would be where a Member
was required to defend its implementation of the waiver under a
PTA/BIT.251 In this regard, conclusions reached by WTO adjudicators on the application of the VCLT in the WTO context may not be
relevant to the tasks of non-WTO adjudicators in resolving inconsistencies between WTO waivers and other non-WTO agreements.
Adjudicators in other legal fora, such as PTA dispute settlement tribunals or investment arbitrators, may find little reason to follow the
reasoning of the AB in Peru—Agricultural Products. This would
likely produce a more favorable outcome for WTO Members seeking to rely on a WTO waiver in avoiding enforcement of non-WTO
248

See id. at 121.
See Ruse-Khan, supra note 197, at 40.
250 Cf. Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The Role of Customary International Law, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION BEYOND BORDERS (Axel Metzger & Henning
Grosse Ruse-Khan eds., forthcoming 2022). For Ruse-Khan, the “broader contextual
framework within which international IP treaties operate” should be considered, lest WTO
law operate in “clinical isolation.” See also Ruse-Khan, supra note 197, at 38–39
(explaining the argumentum a contrario from the lex specialis that the Appellate Body
applied in Peru—Agricultural Products).
251 See Nottage & Sebastian, supra note 230, at 1002. A TRIPS waiver is particularly
unique in that it reduces what are already minimum standards under TRIPS. Id.
249
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obligations, because a waiver may be taken to have priority over
other agreements under the VCLT.
Whether these legal technicalities make any practical difference
to the effectiveness of a COVID-19 TRIPS waiver may depend on
other practical and political questions. It is difficult to imagine that
a WTO Member would ever seek to enforce cognate PTA obligations that have been waived under a WTO Agreement. Doing so
would arguably be contrary to the principle of pacta sunt servanda
as enshrined by Article 26 of the VCLT, on the basis that the State
has failed to honor the TRIPS Agreement, as waived, in good
faith.252 This is less clear in the BIT context, where the claimant is
ordinarily a private investor rather than a State party.253
As alluded to above, the foregoing discussion does not account
for circumstances in which a WTO waiver merely removes the right
to dispute settlement with respect to a certain obligation (at either
the domestic or international level) but that same right subsists under
a PTA/BIT. In such a case, no question as to the hierarchy or displacement of substantive obligations would arise. It would be a
question of divergences across separate legal regimes as to the jurisdiction to hear disputes on similar subject matter. This raises the
question whether a TRIPS waiver that operated through suspension
of dispute settlement mechanisms would require simultaneous
amendments to, or waivers of, other international economic agreements. The next section discusses the possibility of invoking the
principle of estoppel under customary international law to address
this issue.
4. Estoppel
The role of estoppel within the WTO has received some attention in the jurisprudence and in academic sources.254 However,

252

See generally Andrew D. Mitchell, Good Faith in WTO Dispute Settlement, 7 MELB.
J. INT’L L. 339, 346–47 (2006); Cottier & Foltea, supra note 242, at 53 n.31.
253 See International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, The ICSID Caseload
– Statistics (Aug. 4, 2022), https://icsid.worldbank.org/resources/publications/icsidcaseload-statistics (last visited Oct. 30, 2022) (almost exclusively investor-state disputes).
254
See Andrew D. Mitchell & David Heaton, The Inherent Jurisdiction of WTO
Tribunals: The Select Application of Public International Law Required by the Judicial
Function, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 559, 565 (2010); see also Simon A B Schropp & David
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discussion has focused primarily on multiple claims across separate
regimes,255 or alternatives to adjudication that lead to a binding decision or mutually agreed solution.256 Much like the interaction between WTO waivers and PTA/BITs more generally, estoppel has
received little attention as a tool for reconciling inconsistencies in
the specific context of a waiver.
Could estoppel be invoked on the basis that a WTO waiver
founded a representation that PTA/BIT dispute resolution proceedings would not be brought? As a practical matter, if estoppel were
invoked on this basis, it would be invoked by a Member seeking the
benefit of a waiver in a PTA/BIT forum using principles of international customary law, rather than at the WTO. This notwithstanding,
it is worth noting that WTO tribunals have limited the scope and
operation of estoppel within the WTO to what have been identified
as the “narrow parameters set out in the DSU.”257 Notwithstanding
that PTA (and BIT) tribunals may draw upon WTO principles in
non-WTO dispute settlement, we consider how estoppel might apply in the waiver context while assuming that it would not be subject
to the same restrictions on its use at the WTO.
The requirements of a successful estoppel claim within international public law are said to be:
(i) an unambiguous statement of fact (i.e., a representation);
Palemeter, Commentary on the Appellate Body Report in EC–Bananas III (Article 21.5):
Waiver-Thin, or Lock, Stock, and Metric Ton?, 9WORLD TRADE REV. 7, 15–16 (2010);
Vidigal, supra note 191, at 1043–44.
255
See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Export Subsidies on Sugar, ¶
312, WTO Docs. WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R (Apr. 28, 2005);
Panel Report, Argentina—Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil, ¶¶ 7.38,
7.41, WTO Doc. WT/DS241/6 (May 22, 2003) [hereinafter Argentina—Poultry].
256
See Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Suspension of Obligations in
the EC—Hormones Dispute, ¶ 340, WTO Doc. WT/DS322/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008);
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas (Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU By Ecuador), ¶ 212,
WTO Docs. WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA (Nov. 26, 2008).
257
The AB has reasoned that there is “little in the DSU that explicitly limits the rights of
WTO Members to bring an action.” EC–Bananas–Recourse to Arbitration, supra note 177
¶ 227 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Export Subsidies on Sugar, supra note 255). For a
general overview and criticisms of these limitations, see Mitchell and Heaton, supra note
254, at 608–15.
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(ii)

that is voluntary, unconditional and authorized;
and
(iii) which is relied on in good faith to the detriment
of the other party or to the advantage of the
party making the statement.258
As the question of detrimental reliance would very much depend
on the circumstances of the case, we focus exclusively on whether a
waiver could reasonably constitute a representation for these purposes. Arguments that a representation has not been made by adoption of a WTO waiver could be based on the claim that a decision of
the Ministerial Conference does not constitute a representation made
by a Member, or that an instrument in the form of a TRIPS waiver
is not a representation.
The first claim encounters difficulties because it disregards the
multilateral character of Ministerial decisions, which stand authoritatively for the decisions and representations of constituent Members.259 The second claim is more likely to turn on whether a representation can be implied, and whether the adoption of an instrument
is sufficient to constitute an implied representation.
In EC—Asbestos, it was argued that the EC should be estopped
from departing from its purported representation that the TBT
Agreement applied to the impugned Decree, because it had made a
representation to that effect by notifying the Committee on the Technical Barriers to Trade about the Decree and through certain statements it made during consultations.260 However, the Panel considered that TBT notifications are made for reasons of transparency and
do not have any recognized legal effect.261 The Panel’s requirement
of “legal effect” clearly reflects its desire to stay well within the

258

See James Crawford, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 406–
07 (9th ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2019); see also Panel Report, Argentina—Definitive AntiDumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil, supra note 255 at ¶ 7.20.
259
See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 9, arts. IV, IX.1.
260 See Mitchell & Heaton, supra note 254, at 610 (citing Panel Report, European
Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, ¶ 8.60,
WTO Doc. WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000)). It should be noted Members’ representations
during consultations are “without prejudice” and therefore estoppel would not apply to
such representations. Dispute Settlement Understanding, art. 4.6.
261 See Mitchell & Heaton, supra note 254, at 610
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parameters of the DSU in deciding its own jurisdiction and ultimately which instruments can “bind the Panel.”262 In any case, a decision to waive obligations under Article IX.3 clearly satisfies the
Panel’s requirement of “legal effect.” 263
In Argentina—Poultry, the Panel denied Argentina’s claim that
Brazil’s previous acceptance of arbitral awards invalidated Brazil’s
complaint against Argentina.264 The Panel quoted the Panel in EEC
(Member States)—Bananas I and concluded that “estoppel can only
‘result from the express, or in exceptional cases implied consent of
the complaining parties,’” and that “the facts alleged by Argentina
are not sufficient to conclude that Brazil has ‘consented’ whether
explicitly or implicitly, not to bring this dispute before the WTO.”265
The Panel’s reasoning was that the Protocol of Brasilia contained
“no provision limiting the rights of parties to request a panel under
WTO agreements with respect to a measure that had already been
the subject of a dispute under the Protocol.”266
In the non-WTO context, the Permanent Court of International
Justice (“PCIJ”) in Legal Status of Eastern Greenland accepted that
Norway’s entry into several bilateral and multilateral international
agreements that described Greenland as part of Denmark constituted
a reaffirmation by Norway of Denmark’s sovereignty over Greenland.267 This was sufficient for Norway to have “debarred herself
from contesting Danish sovereignty over the whole of Greenland.”268 The PCIJ’s successor, the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ”), has taken a comparatively more constrained view of estoppel requirements. In Land and Maritime Boundary Case, the ICJ
stated that “estoppel would only arise if by its acts or declarations
Cameroon had consistently made it fully clear that it had agreed to

262

See id.
See id.
264 See Panel Report, Argentina—Poultry, supra note 255, ¶¶ 7.38, 7.41.
265
Id. at ¶ 7.27.
266 Id.
267
See Mitchell & Heaton, supra note 254, at 612 (citing Legal Status of Eastern
Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.JJ. (ser.A/B) No. 53, at 22 (Ape. 5)).
268 Id.
263
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settle the boundary dispute . . . by bilateral avenues alone.”269 Similarly, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, the ICJ said that “a
very definite, very consistent course of conduct” would have to be
established for a state to be bound by a treaty to which it had not
formally acceded.270
While estoppel was not made out in EC—Asbestos or Argentina—Poultry, these decisions together with Legal Status of Eastern
Greenland indicate that the adoption of an agreement, notification
or other instrument may, in some circumstances, be sufficient to
amount to an implied representation. In the language of the North
Sea Continental Shelf Case, a legally binding waiver decision may
well amount to a “very definite” course of conduct.271 However, the
claims of estoppel at the WTO discussed above failed primarily because of the focus placed on the legal effect or substantive content
of the instruments adopted.272 These considerations are likely to be
relevant in any estoppel claim that is based on the adoption of a
TRIPS waiver.
Relevantly, even if the adoption of a decision by the Ministerial
Conference does constitute a representation at international customary law, the question arises: “representation as to what?” A waiver
is a source of negative rights that provides Members with a shield
against certain claims.273 Technically speaking, waivers do not guarantee immunity from a suit or other proceedings.274 Therefore, a
waiver may not itself amount to a representation not to bring dispute
resolution proceedings, unless the waiver in question directly addresses the right to dispute resolution proceedings. Relevantly, the
original 2020 proposal did so by precluding challenges of “any
measure[s] taken in conformity with the provisions of the waivers . . . through the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism.”275
269

See Mitchell, supra note 252, at 348 (citing Land and Maritime Boundary between
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, ICR. Rep. 275,
303).
270
North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, ICJ Rep. 3, 25
(Feb. 20, 1969).
271
See id.
272 See Feichtner, supra note 14; Harrison, supra note 121.
273
See Harrison, supra note 121, at 415.
274 See id.
275 Revised Decision Text, supra note 8, at 4.
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Even then, what implications does this have for the validity or conformity of a waiver to Article IX:3, which applies only to waive the
obligations of Members and not rights to institute proceedings?
Finally, assuming, arguendo, that a TRIPS waiver is an implicit
representation that a Member will not bring dispute resolution proceedings in respect of a waived obligation, it would be a representation not to bring such proceedings at the WTO rather than proceedings to enforce a PTA obligation at another forum. While the principle of res judicata may apply in situations of cross-jurisdictional
claims,276 that principle would have no application where no WTO
claim has previously been brought or settled.
In Argentina—Poultry, the Panel found that plurilateral rules
“impose[d] no restriction on Brazil’s right to bring subsequent WTO
dispute settlement proceedings in respect of the same measure,” but
also that it was not “bound by the rulings of non-WTO dispute settlement bodies.”277 From this, Vidigal concludes that “restrictions
on the jurisdiction (or on the legal findings) of WTO panels may not
derive from inter se modifications, but require a basis in multilateral
norms.”278 Whether the converse applies to non-WTO dispute settlement bodies with respect to a waiver of WTO dispute resolution
mechanisms has no clear answer. It may be that a PTA tribunal
would simply pay deference to representations made at the WTO—
perhaps in an attempt to maintain comity in the sphere of international economic law, or perhaps because of the WTO Agreements’
distinct multilateral character. As Articles 30, 41, and other provisions of the VCLT demonstrate, this character is recognized to some
degree by customary international law and the VCLT as having a
higher rank in the hierarchy of international laws than that which
inheres in plurilateral and bilateral agreements.279
***
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The role of res judicata in WTO dispute settlement was left uncertain by the Appellate
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Implementation of a broad-brush TRIPS waiver at the domestic
level may require navigation through complex legal issues, both domestic and international, that may impede, delay or render uncertain
the practical benefits of a stand-alone waiver of TRIPS obligations.
That said, specific waivers that do not provide for the effective removal or suspension of IP rights altogether, but rather enable
measures to override their exclusive effect in the broader public interest, by analogy with or building in a complementary fashion upon
existing limitations and exceptions may be more adapted to practical
implementation in a manner compatible with constitutional requirements and overlapping non-WTO obligations. As one of us has argued,280 the central, organizing issue may be construed as determining and enabling the necessary scope for effective agency on the part
of national governments, and shaping the response around these
more clearly defined needs; arguably, this is one of the practical lessons from the process leading up to the Ministerial Decision.
III. SECURITY EXCEPTION
The security exception in Article 73(b) of TRIPS has been identified by some commentators as providing an avenue for introducing
IP measures that are sensitive to public health requirements, to increase manufacturing capacity for vaccines.281 Article 73(b) provides:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed:
...
(b) to prevent a Member from taking any action
which it considers necessary for the protection of
its essential security interests;
...
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations . . . 282
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See Taubman, supra note 90.
It is noteworthy that Article 73(b) has not been formally identified by any WTO
Member as a viable option in addressing IP barriers to the pandemic response.
282 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 73(b).
281
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Ultimately, there are significant legal, practical and political limitations to invoking Article 73(b) of TRIPS as a potential alternative
to a TRIPS waiver or as a reliable source of flexibility in ensuring
access to essential health products.
Rather than a source of flexibility in the substantive rights and
obligations enjoyed and imposed on Members, or a suspension of
specific TRIPS standards, Article 73(b) operates as a defense in the
event of WTO challenge. The exception has been analyzed extensively, primarily outside but now also within the pandemic context.
In past dispute settlement cases considering security exceptions in
WTO Agreements,283 panels have found that a Member may decide
what constitutes its “essential security interests” and whether a
measure is “necessary” to protect those interests,284 subject to the
Member interpreting and applying those terms in good faith.285
Derived from a general requirement of good faith interpretation
is a minimum “requirement of plausibility” that ensures the “essential security interest” relied upon by the defendant Member has some
plausible connection with any one of the circumstances or subject
matters listed in the exception.286 The existence of such circumstances (and whether the interest claimed has a plausible connection
with them) is to be determined objectively, and therefore constitutes
the exception’s only truly justiciable element. We limit our brief
analysis of Article 73(b) to the issue of what constitutes an “emergency in international relations”—the only limb we consider to have
a potential direct plausible connection with a public health crisis.287
Abbott, in analyzing this issue, relies primarily on the WHO’s
statement declaring the COVID-19 crisis a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, citing “interaction between
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The GATT and TRIPS security exceptions are the only two WTO security exceptions
to have been adjudicated: Panel Report, Russia—Measures concerning Traffic in Transit,
WTO Doc. WT/DS512/R (Apr. 5, 2019) and Panel Report, Saudi Arabia—Measures
concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS567/R (June
16, 2020).
284
Panel Report, Russia—Traffic in Transit, supra note 283, ¶¶ 7.146–7.147.
285 Id. at ¶ 7.132.
286
Panel Report, Saudi Arabia—Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note
283, ¶¶ 7.230, 7.242.
287 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 73(b).
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States . . . the allocation of medicines (including vaccines) and medical devices among States” and ultimately framing “emergency in
international relations” as an issue of inequitable access to health
care.288 More plausible grounds posited by Abbott for classifying
the pandemic as an international relations emergency are the “sharp
slowdown in international trade and travel” and “hostility and
threats.”289 Without entering into the debate surrounding the security exception’s general parameters under WTO disciplines, we find
an objective characterization of the pandemic and vaccine inequity
as an “emergency in international relations” to be somewhat
strained.
In Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, the Panel
defined “international relations” as “generally to mean ‘world politics’, or ‘global political interaction, primarily among sovereign
states’,” and determined that an “emergency in international relations” refers “generally to a situation of armed conflict, or of latent
armed conflict, or of heightened tension or crisis, or of general instability engulfing or surrounding a state.”290 The Panel considered
that these are situations that “give rise to particular types of interests . . . i.e. defense or military interests, or maintenance of law and
public order interests.”291
The Panel reasoned that “as the existence of an emergency in
international relations is an objective state of affairs, the determination of whether the relevant action was ‘taken in time of’ an ‘emergency in international relations’ . . . is that of an objective fact, subject to objective determination.”292 The Panel interpreted the term
“taken in time of” (in contrast to “relating to” for the other subparagraphs) to describe a temporal connection between the action and
the events of emergency in international relations. Therefore, for a
measure to fall under the third limb, it must be a measure “taken in
time of war or other emergency in international relations.”293
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Frederick Abbott, The TRIPS Agreement Article 73 Security Exceptions and the
COVID-19 Pandemic 7 (S. Centre, Rsch. Paper No. 116, 2020).
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290 Panel Report, Russia—Traffic in Transit, supra note 284, ¶¶ 7.73, 7.76.
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Id. ¶ 7.76.
292 Id. ¶ 7.77.
293 Id. ¶ 7.5.5.
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While a pandemic or vaccine inequity are each certainly unlikely
to constitute a situation of “armed conflict” or “heightened tension,”
it could be that they at least constitute a “crisis” or even “general
instability engulfing or surrounding a state.”294 However, fitting a
pandemic and vaccine inequity into a broad interpretation of these
terms seems to ignore the context in which the Panel used them. In
this regard, the Panel clarified that:
the matters addressed by [the other] subparagraphs
give rise to similar or convergent concerns, which
can be formulated in terms of the specific security
interests [which] . . . are all defense and military interests, as well as maintenance of law and public order interests. An “emergency in international relations” must be understood as eliciting the same type
of interests as those arising from the other matters
addressed in the enumerated subparagraphs of Article XXI(b).295
The Panel also stated that “the reference to ‘war’ in conjunction
with ‘or other emergency in international relations’ . . . and the interests that generally arise during war . . . suggest that political or
economic differences between Members are not sufficient, of themselves, to constitute an emergency in international relations.”296
These clarifications by the Panel reveal that the words “crisis”
and “general instability engulfing or surrounding a state” are to be
understood in the context of threats arising out of a conflict, or the
threat of a conflict, between nations. Even if an increase in hostility
and violence could be linked to the pandemic as a whole, it is unlikely that measures implemented to increase IP access for the purposes of increasing the manufacture and distribution of COVID-19
vaccines could be justified on the basis of a security exception along
these lines. The connection between increasing vaccine access and
preventing violence or social unrest in response to the pandemic’s
various social and economic impacts would be far too weak to satisfy the minimum requirement of plausibility. Moreover, to our
294
295
296
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knowledge, such violence and social unrest has been observed in the
pandemic context solely as a response to domestic policy choices,
rather than as a product of conflict between nations.
Leaving the interpretation and application of Article 73(b) aside,
the practical limitations of this mechanism as an access tool can be
illustrated by the proposal to use the security exception to suspend
the effect of Article 31(f), thus circumventing the need to rely on
Article 31bis in enabling government authorization of vaccine production mainly for export without a patent holder’s consent.297 This
scenario would not arise if a Member authorized use partly to address a domestic emergency and partly for export. It would presumably entail establishing some form of understanding with each recipient Member that it had established that its essential security interests were at stake during a time of emergency in international relations, and somehow framing export as necessary to address these
essential security interests. One commentator has suggested that is:
doubtful whether [a Member] can invoke Article
73(b)(iii) to justify the suspension of the enforcement
of patent rights in its own territory in order to protect
the essential security interests of [another Member]
by exporting patented medicines or vaccines [to
it].298
Given the options available for streamlined and coordinated use
of Article 31bis—and its present implementation in many exporting
producers’ laws—this option raises considerable practical questions, apart from the legal ones. Hence, we question whether Article
73(b) would be practically effective in responding to public health
issues. This is particularly so given political sensitives surrounding
the exception, and the expansive array of options available to Members for these purposes elsewhere within the TRIPS Agreement.
Given that the essential need is for greater solidarity and cooperation
among Members, in the spirit of the “Solidarity Call for Action,” the
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See Emmanuel Kolawole Oke, Is the National Security Exception in the TRIPS
Agreement a Realistic Option in Confronting COVID-19?, EJIL:TALK! (Aug. 6, 2020),
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signal that individual Members’ national security interests should
prevail over vaccine equity may also run counter to much needed
political convergence on a more cooperative and collaborative pandemic response.
CONCLUSION
The option of a further, tailored waiver of specific TRIPS obligations remains a potential future option to overcome identified obstacles to vaccine access, either for individual countries or for
groups of them in cooperation. Should the need or momentum for a
broader and more targeted waiver arise, the question may be how to
coordinate it in a way that makes it amenable to WTO consensus.
Although the right to request WTO waivers plainly remains available for any Member, there are likely to be perceived political obstacles to making a further waiver proposal, as well as challenges for
coordinating and presenting a common position before the WTO.
Bound up with these political obstacles are the legal and practical
challenges discussed in this article, which have significance beyond
any potential COVID-19 waiver.
One such challenge is the need to decide whether a waiver would
be implemented at the international level (e.g., through ‘peace
clauses’), the domestic level (e.g., through the suspension of IP
rights and remedies), or both. The implications of each vis-à-vis domestic constitutional and IP law is one relevant consideration.
Among other challenges and considerations is the need to understand, in advance, how the implementation of a waiver would interact with multilateral conventions and bilateral and regional trade
agreements, as well as the enforcement of BITs by investors. While
PTA State parties may be reluctant to enforce obligations they have
waived at the WTO, investors may be less inclined to forego their
rights under BITs.
It is, of course, possible to theorize how the VLCT and customary international law principles may help to disentangle some of the
ostensible conflicts between a waiver and other international agreements. If, however, Members wish to resolve public health crises
cohesively, then the theoretical and practical implications explored
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in this article may need to be considered by WTO Members in advance of multilateral proposals and negotiations.
The Ministerial Decision is unlikely to give rise to many of these
limitations because, in limiting its effect to a waiver of Article 31(f),
it does not reach beyond the limits placed on compulsory licenses in
Article 31 to the grant of IPR protection, numerous rights arising
from that protection, or possibility of dispute resolution at international or domestic levels. Nevertheless, as seems to be implicit in
the Ministerial Decision, the existing flexibilities available under
TRIPS as clarified and confirmed by the Doha Declaration—when
properly and suitably utilized—are likely to remain effective tools
in ensuring widespread access to essential health products.

